Computationalism: Dualism or Panpsychism?

Posted on March 3, 2024 by James Cross

In philosophy of mind, the computational theory of mind (CTM), also known as computationalism, is a family of views that hold that the human mind is an information processing system and that cognition and consciousness together are a form of computation.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Computational_theory_of_mind

What is computation?

The question of when a physical system is computing is fundamentally a question about the relationship of abstract mathematical/logical entities to physical ones A ‘computation’ is a mathematical abstraction described in one of the logical formalisms developed by theoretical computer scientists. A ‘computer’ is a physical system with actual constituent parts and its own internal interactions that take it from one physical state to another. The computer is taken to stand in a certain relation to the computation—if we can formulate this relation, then we can answer our question of when a physical system is performing computation. To act as a computer is always to be performing a specific computation, we therefore need to ask: when is this physical system performing that (not always known) computation, and what is the relation required between the physical system and the abstract computation that this can be determined?

https://royalsocietypublishing.org/doi/10.1098/rspa.2014.0182

If your version of computationalism believes “abstract mathematical/logical entities” are consciousness, then it would be non-physicalist. It would be little different from a soul inhabiting something physical.

On the other hand, if your version of computationalism believes only the physical entities implementing the abstract mathematical entities are consciousness then it is would be physical theory but it would allow any type of matter able to create the correct relationship to be conscious. That would mean likely any form of solid matter, maybe liquids and gases too, could be conscious. In other words, it would be a variant of panpsychism.

Posted in Consciousness | 6 Comments

A Thought Experiment

Posted on February 29, 2024 by James Cross

Frequently the lack of direct accessibility to the thoughts and experiences others is mentioned as problem for explaining consciousness. What if the problem could be solved?

Imagine this scenario.

Subject A has a silicon brain implant with an external access port that can capture neural activity of his brain.

Subject B has a similar implant in her brain.

If the two access ports were plugged into each other, would Subjects A and B have direct access to the thoughts and experiences of the other person?

Would each subject have two fields of vision?

Could Subject A remember experiences from Subject B’s childhood?

This experiment certainly isn’t a total impossibility. Implants, including Musk’s Neuralink, are being developed to capture brain activity. Sign up here. How long before somebody plugs the implants from two different brains together? The movie Brainstorm from 1983 envisioned this possibility and also had a mechanism for recording the brain activity on spools of tape.

Would the other brain seem familiar or foreign?

Would Subject A see the same or similar colors from Subject B’s brain?

Would Subject A and Subject B merge into one consciousness?

Or, would nothing different happen in the consciousness of the two subjects?

Just asking.

Posted in AI, Consciousness | 15 Comments

The Subjectivity Problem

Posted on February 17, 2024 by James Cross

Subjectivity is another notion sometimes equated with the qualitative or the phenomenal aspects of consciousness in the literature –https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/consciousness/#Sub

Although, as the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy notes, subjectivity should probably be considered an aspect of consciousness rather than equivalent to it. Subjectivity is, however, frequently mentioned as a problem needing explanation. It is also closely aligned with the notion of consciousness as private.

But is it a problem at all?

In fact, I think subjectivity is a good representation of reality.

In fact, I think all reality we know is subjective. It is just that some of that reality mimics aspects of the reality outside of our own subjective one. From the perspective of our consciousness experience, we only perceive second-hand neuronal representations of external and internal reality. Those representations are internal and subjective.

Posted in Consciousness, Memory | 5 Comments