That the laws of physics are computable seems to be an article of faith among some. If the laws of physics are computable, then the brain (and consciousness) would be computable unless we are willing to entertain supernatural exemptions from the laws. The computability of reality, however, is actually a conjecture. It certainly can’t be proven because we can never be sure we might come up with physical phenomena that could never be computed.
We have good reason to suspect that the conjecture is false. There is the fermion problem in the Standard Model that I’ve discussed previously. There are also the problem of computation with many-body problems in condensed matter physics. A particular case of the many-body problem called the “spectral gap problem” seems to demonstrate that at least one physical phenomena cannot be computed.
Interestingly, recent work in condensed matter quantum physics indicates that—possibly—quantum many-body systems could infringe the Total thesis. In 2012, Eisert, Müller and Gogolin established the surprising result that
the very natural physical problem of determining whether certain outcome sequences cannot occur in repeated quantum measurements is undecidable, even though the same problem for classical measurements is readily decidable. (Eisert, Müller & Gogolin 2012: 260501.1)
This was a curtain-raiser to a series of dramatic results about the uncomputability of quantum phase transitions, by Cubitt and his group (Cubitt, Perez-Garcia, & Wolf 2015; Bausch, Cubitt, Lucia, & Perez-Garcia 2020; Bausch, Cubitt, & Watson 2021). These results concern the “spectral gap”, an important determinant of the properties of a substance. A quantum many-body system is said to be “gapped” if the system has a well-defined next least energy-level above the system’s ground energy-level, and is said to be “gapless” otherwise (i.e., if the energy spectrum is continuous). The “spectral gap problem” is the problem of determining whether a given many-body system is gapped or gapless.
The uncomputability results of Cubitt et al. stem from their discovery that the halting problem can be encoded in the spectral gap problem. Deciding whether a model system of the type they have studied is gapped or gapless, given a description of the local interactions, is “at least as hard as solving the Halting Problem”
There is a great account of the development of the Cubitt et al proof written by the researchers themselves in a Scientific American article called the “The Unsolvable Problem.”
If the laws of physics are not completely computable, then the question of whether the brain is computable becomes an empirical question.
Is there empirical evidence that suggests activity in the brain that is not Turing computable?
I think the answer is yes.
Cognition seems to be accompanied by synchronous firings of groups of neurons sometime in distant parts of the brain. There is evidence some of this is generated from a form of communication that is not mediated by chemicals or physical connections and goes under the general term of “ephaptic coupling.”
In the present study, we show that slow periodic activity in the longitudinal hippocampal slice is a self-regenerating wave which can propagate with and without chemical or electrical synaptic transmission at the same speeds. We also show that applying local extracellular electric fields can modulate or even block the propagation of this wave in both in silico and in vitro models. Our results support the notion that ephaptic coupling plays a significant role in the propagation of the slow hippocampal periodic activity. Moreover, these results indicate that a neural network can give rise to sustained self-propagating waves by ephaptic coupling, suggesting a novel propagation mechanism for neural activity under normal physiological conditions.
Travelling waves propagate in different directions during separate cognitive processes. In episodic memory, travelling waves tended to propagate in a posterior-to-anterior direction during successful memory encoding and in an anterior-to-posterior direction during recall. Because travelling waves of oscillations correspond to local neuronal spiking, these patterns indicate that rhythmic pulses of activity move across the brain in different directions for separate behaviors.
The traveling waves – think of a stadium wave – have an uncanny resemblance to turbulence. They began to appear in the conscious brain on waking and mostly vanish during sleep and unconsciousness.
Furthermore, we build a whole-brain model with coupled oscillators to demonstrate that the best fit to the data corresponds to a region of maximally developed turbulent-like dynamics, which also corresponds to maximal sensitivity to the processing of external stimulations (information capability). The model shows the economy of anatomy by following the exponential distance rule of anatomical connections as a cost-of-wiring principle. This establishes a firm link between turbulent-like brain activity and optimal brain function.
A complete description of turbulence is one of the unsolved problems in physics.
The brain consists of connections of neurons called the connectome. The number of neurons, of course, varies by species. The C. elegans brain has a few more than a hundred. The human brain has around 85 million in total with about 16 billion in the cortex. Undoubtedly communication of information in either brain is largely through the connectome. The connectome might explain completely the operation of the C. elegans brain. In that sense, its brain might be computable. The human brain on the other hand seems to have supra-connectome properties. Turbulent, wave-like, and vortical activity arise as emergent properties as a function of the complexity, size, and structure of the connectome. This activity has causal force since it produces real neural firings that might not be predictable from the connectome itself.
A supra-connectome might be the evolutionary solution for communicating tightly coupled data across a fragmented and asynchronous brain. By tightly coupled data, I mean data that couldn’t be broken into chunks without losing meaning. For example, this paragraph could be broken into words but, if the words arrive in pieces and at different times, it might be impossible to reassemble the paragraph and understand its meaning. Turbulent activity in the brain may have arisen evolutionarily as a side effect of size and been detrimental. Rather than eliminating it, however, evolution might have learn to control it through a critical balance between excitatory and inhibitory pressures and to use it as an information transmission mechanism over and above the connectome itself.
Broad Speculations 
I think it’s more productive, rather than ask if the laws of physics are computable, what is computation? And what is it missing from what currently happens in nature? It may be that our notion of computation might have to expand at some point.
A closely related question is, is reality understandable? In principle, we can never say for sure that it is. It’s always possible we may hit a problem that can never be solved.
Which isn’t to say we haven’t had to expand mathematics at times. The question is whether we’ll ever hit something where that won’t be possible. It doesn’t seem productive to ever assume it in any particular case, because we won’t know unless we try. And the patterns of scientific history is what appear to be unsolvable problems in one period do eventually get solved, although it may take the development of entirely new paradigms to do it.
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The quote from The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy is from a section on Church-Turing about the Deutsch-Wolfram Thesis:
The Total Thesis:
Every physical aspect of the behavior of any physical system can be calculated (to any specified degree of accuracy) by a universal Turing machine.
The spectral gap problem suggests:
“Our result implies that there exists no algorithm to determine whether an arbitrary model is gapped or gapless, and that there exist models for which the presence or absence of a spectral gap is independent of the axioms of mathematics.”
Cubitt, T., Perez-Garcia, D. & Wolf, M. Undecidability of the spectral gap. Nature 528, 207–211 (2015). https://doi.org/10.1038/nature16059
Of course, we could expand the meaning of computation beyond universal Turing machines.
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So for spectral gaps, I think if you’re given a particular Hamiltonian (say that of a human brain) then you can diagonalise it and compute the gap just using linear algebra. What’s not computable is if ur given a FAMILY of hamiltonians H(n) where n is the system size and your task is determine whether the gap closes as n—>infinity. Is correct or did i miss up something?
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Sorry, but I have no idea whether you are correct.
The main point about the spectral gap problem is that it seems to be an example of a physical system that disproves the thesis that behavior of any physical system can be calculated (to any specified degree of accuracy) by a universal Turing machine. If there is one physical system that disproves the thesis then it certainly is possible other physical systems also can not be simulated by computation. If the brain is one of those systems, then we can’t assume AI can ever simulate it fully.
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The only way that I’m able to keep complex speculation like this straight, is to begin from fundamentals and then work up from there to potentially say something intelligent. Are (1) the laws of physics (2) computable? Each element seems too vague for me to address. And though I do agree with the sentiments of why someone might say “No”, with a more fundamental dive I think I can get to a better question that might even suggest “Yes”. I’ll explain.
Let’s begin with a presumption that reality functions by means of systemic causality alone. From here there can be nothing magical regarding the function of our computers or the brains which are often considered to also compute. But how do computers effectively work? Most fundamentally I think they accept input information, algorithmically process that information, and the resulting processed information goes on to inform something appropriate. So with the brain as a computer, processed brain information can only exist as such by informing something appropriate for anything that it effectively computes. Thus if light information enters the brain through the eyes, a processing of that input information alone will not create something that sees. Instead processed brain information must inform something appropriate to exist as what sees. I suspect that through neural firing it informs an electromagnetic field that itself exist as such. Regardless, causality mandates something appropriate be informed to exist phenomenally rather than not.
Here we have the brain as a computer that animates the right sort of physics in order to create consciousness. Thus one of our computing machines ought to be able to do this as well if it were to also animate the right sort of physics.
There’s more however because it seems to me that consciousness itself effectively functions as a phenomenal sort of computer. The computers that we build function on the basis of electricity. The brain computers that evolution built function on the basis of complex electro-chemical dynamics. I consider consciousness itself to function on the basis of the desire to feel good rather than bad. This value dynamic yields a purposeful form of function where full ideas can potentially be understood, which some call “gestalts”. Theoretically evolution required this value driven gestalt form of computation because under more open environments, direct coding doesn’t work well enough. Here it could instead punish and reward its creations as incentive for them to consciously figure out what to do.
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In my comment to Mike, I explained that I am primarily talking about Turing computable.
It could be argued that the changing of state in anything constitutes some form of computer, but that tends to make everything – rocks , sand dunes, and all – a computer. The question for me is whether a description of of the state changing can always be boiled down to a sequential manipulations of symbols. At least a part of physics doesn’t seem to lend itself to such a reduction.
“I consider consciousness itself to function on the basis of the desire to feel good rather than bad.”
That might be too narrow. I don’t see why insects might not be conscious but without a desire to “feel good.” It appears the amygdala may play a key in the human sense of well-being. It’s possible for me to imagine an insect might eat, drink, and mate from automated mechanisms without any sense of feeling good, but still rely on conscious perception to find its prey or navigate to a nest.
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I’m not sure if I’m talking about brains being Turing computable or not. Maybe not. I figured your point was that brains aren’t computers and therefore standard computers shouldn’t be able to create consciousness because in that case consciousness shouldn’t be about “computation”? Did you have a different point about brains not being Turing computers?
Regardless I do consider brains to be computers far more effectively that to say that rocks are computers, Turing or not. I base this upon my concept of “information”. We could say that a DVD under a table leg “informs” that table as a shim. That’s not usually how we talk about information though. More appropriate might be the data encrypted on a DVD that can be unlocked with a DVD player. So while I wouldn’t say that there is any true computation occurring when a DVD “informs” a table leg, I would say that computation should occur when a DVD informs a DVD player. Here there should be input information that gets algorithmically processed and then goes on to inform a screen, speakers, and perhaps more.
My point however is that while brains do seem very much like computers since, unlike rocks, they algorithmically process input information to operate output function, consciousness should thus require some sort of consciousness physics in order to exist. So here for example our brains compute when input light information gets algorithmically processed in a way that animates the consciousness physics by which we see. Thus a standard computer could do the same sort of thing if it were to also operate the same sort of physics. Any objections with that position?
On insects potentially being conscious, that’s certainly what I suspect in general. My point however is that if they can’t in some sense feel good or bad, then they also can’t be conscious. To me that’s a definitional distinction — some degree of phenomenal existence versus not. If not then there should be “nothing it is like” to exist as a spider as opposed to a rock.
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You got my basic point about computation and brains.
I think brains are computer-like but probably a hybrid type of computing. That is sort of my point about the connectome and supra-connectome. Actually my distinction is very similar to McFadden’s distinction in Integrating information in the brain’s EM field: the cemi field theory of consciousness. The connectome is the serial processing. But I don’t think EM field by itself completely explains how the supra-connectome works, although I think ephaptic coupling via the EM field may be a critical piece that instigates the traveling waves and vortices.
My point about insects is that I’m not sure if any particular quale or combination of qualia is the sine non qua of consciousness.
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It sounds like we’re using different definitions for “consciousness” here. The trick will be for me to use your definition when I try to assess your ideas, and otherwise you mine. In my case the existence of any quale whatsoever will mandate consciousness in that sense. It needn’t be functional to a given organism inherently, though I do think qualia generally evolved to become functional. Furthermore I suspect qualia to only exist in the form of the correct parameters of electromagnetic field that they’re made of. It’s a question for science to empirically determine one way or the other. I’ll go with whatever science finds in the end, though today empirical testing seems difficult given the widespread popularity of unfalsifiable proposals.
I’d like to understand your model, though I’ve never quite found it to be simple enough for me to grasp. Let’s try this. I’ll present a simple model of my position. I’ll also present two other models in that form. Then perhaps you could present your consciousness model in the same form for my potential understanding.
I believe that the brain essentially exists as a non-conscious computer that thus accepts input information, algorithmically processes it, and the processed information goes on to inform various things that are often muscular, such as the heart. For many organisms however certain input information causes neurons to fire with a synchrony that creates an EM field that itself exists as the experiencer of qualia, whether you, me, a dog, insect, or whatever. So theoretically all that we phenomenally are exist in the form of an incredibly integrated field of electromagnetic radiation that thus phenomenally “sense”, “think”, and “decide”. Then when each of us as unified EM fields decide to do something, certain elements of the field ephaptically couple with neurons to cause them to operate muscles in a corresponding way.
Also consider my conception of computationalism. Here again the brain is a non-conscious computer, though now processed information alone can exist as qualia. I consider this wrong because in a causal sense information should only exist as such to the extent that it informs something appropriate. Regardless here there’s some sort of disembodied qualia in the form of “processed information”, whether from the right neural firing, marks on paper converted to other marks on paper, or something else. I don’t think the position accounts for how such consciousness affects the brain to drive the function of muscles, however. “Seeming” conscious appears to be the defining point rather than “being” conscious.
Also consider straight dualism. Here the brain accepts input information and algorithmically processes it for the resulting emergence of a magical soul. I presume that this magical soul then uses its magic to cause neurons to fire in a way that muscles are caused to function as desired.
Observe that in my model consciousness is made of an electromagnetic field. In computationalism it’s made of the nothing that results from processed information alone. In straight dualism it’s made of magic. I wonder if you could frame your model in this form? What might such consciousness be made of? I should also say that I consider this to be an extremely difficult test! Beyond EMF consciousness I’m not sure what else might sensibly pass it. An answer of “not sure yet” would certainly be fine, and hopefully with a bit more that might help me understand.
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I’m not sure our definitions are different. To be clear, I wrote:
“I’m not sure if any particular quale or combination of qualia is the sine non qua of consciousness.”
However, that doesn’t mean that consciousness can be absent qualia of some sort. I’m just saying the sorts and varieties may be extremely varied and because a particular organism lacks one or another type doesn’t mean it is lacking consciousness.
As far as my “model” goes, it hasn’t exactly been the same while we’ve been communicating. It has evolved and will continue to do so. I’m not sure I’ll ever have a complete model.
Your view of the brain seems somewhat closer to Susan Pockett than McFadden. Her view seems to be that everything in the brain per sec is unconscious and consciousness is the EM field side effect of some of those processes. McFadden sees the EM field as an active part of the brain’s information processing.
From Pockett:
“All neural processing is unconscious. The illusion that some of it is conscious results largely from a failure to separate consciousness per se from a number of unconscious processes that normally accompany it—most particularly focal attention. Conscious sensory experiences are not processes at all. They are things: specifically, spatial electromagnetic (EM) patterns, which are presently generated only by ongoing unconscious processing at certain times and places in the mammalian brain, but which in principle could be generated by hardware rather than wetware.”
https://www.mdpi.com/2076-3417/7/12/1248
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Okay so consciousness doesn’t require a particular quale, but any quale. That’s my conception of it too.
On your model not being complete, that’s certainly fine. I’d just suggest that you try to figure out what it’s composed of. All that’s known in physics today is made of something, even gravity. Few even try to go there with consciousness though. That’s why I think so many propose inherently spooky proposals.
Straight from the Wikipedia EMF consciousness article there are a couple of things that put me off Pockett, both in 2020 as I recall and today. It says she believes there is only a single consciousness, and that it has no effect on the world. I guess it could be wrong about her position though. I do agree with her however that it shouldn’t matter how the consciousness field becomes generated, whether by means of human brain or fabricated machine.
“Susan Pockett[1] has advanced a theory, which has a similar physical basis to McFadden’s, with consciousness seen as identical to certain spatiotemporal patterns of the EM field. However, whereas McFadden argues that his deterministic interpretation of the EM field is not out-of-line with mainstream thinking, Pockett suggests that the EM field comprises a universal consciousness that experiences the sensations, perceptions, thoughts and emotions of every conscious being in the universe. However, while McFadden thinks that the field is causal for actions, albeit deterministically, Pockett does not see the field as causal for our actions.” https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Electromagnetic_theories_of_consciousness
Conversely I’ve liked everything that I’ve seen from McFadden. One place where I’m not entirely sure he’s being truthful, is his initial account from the book he published in 1999. That was also his initial quantum biology book where he wanted to include the Penrose and Hameroff quantum consciousness account for the final chapter, though the model didn’t stay consistent with what’s known about QM. So he built his electromagnetic theory for the chapter, and even the ephaptic coupling part where consciousness is suppose to affect brain function. I find it difficult to believe that he could have done this so quickly, and in a way that remained true to his work decades later.
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The single consciousness idea is actually from physics. Effectively there is a single EM field in universe. It differs in strength and form at different points. So, since consciousness is the EM field, there is a single consciousness. That is implicit in what you say too in that all consciousness is composed of the same stuff.
Personally I’m not satisfied with the notion of consciousness as EM field even if it is correct, because it doesn’t by itself explain much. There are too many missing pieces in the puzzle. How do the forms of EM fields map to qualia? How do the brain and neurons generate the different forms? The theory, even if correct, is incomplete.
One of the more interesting parts of Pockett’s view is her suggestion about how the neurons and specifically what sorts of ion states in neurons produce consciousness. If that part of her theory is right, by the way, it makes it unlikely that the EM field could solve the binding problem.
From her paper:
“This gels with the fact that the brain-generated fields proposed by the EM field theory of consciousness as being conscious [70] involve electric dipoles, which means that the strength of the field falls off not with the square of distance from their site of generation, but with the cube of distance from their site of generation [71]; which in turn means that these fields essentially cease to exist as spatial patterns within a few mm of their site of generation [72].”
If the EM field theory is correct, I think Pockett could be right about the mechanism. That means the EM field doesn’t solve the binding problem.
I think there is more than one physical phenomena. The EM field may be part of an explanation but it is incomplete.
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I once saw a tweet from McFadden where he acknowledged that there is only a single electromagnetic field throughout the universe. I think it was in reference to something Sean Carroll said. But McFadden doesn’t presume from this that he thus has a universal consciousness — he doesn’t believe that he has mine any more than I have his. So it’s kind of like the light from my computer screen isn’t all light, and even if the associated EM elements of my screen’s light technically connect with all light throughout the universe. If Pockett doesn’t consider all light to be the same light, or all EMF consciousness to be the same EMF consciousness, then we aren’t in disagreement here. That’s hopefully the case.
I’m not sure how she could justify consciousness being epiphenomenal though. In that case we shouldn’t even be able to talk about it. I’m pretty sure that you and I actually are talking about it. And indeed, this is where McFadden brings in ephaptic coupling as a means for EMF decisions to operate muscles. Such validation should put him in the drivers seat versus competitors.
On missing pieces of the puzzle, why not let science figure all that out empirically? Newton admittedly didn’t answer everything about gravity. This was still a huge advancement for science though. I think there’s already good evidence that McFadden presents a useful model, and even before there has been any dedicated testing.
How does the EMF map to qualia? Presumably through their different amplitudes, frequencies, and energies. If true then those are mere details awaiting discovery. So it’s like the stage of genetics where Watson and Crick posit DNA as an explanation. At that time they had a general model rather than the specific answers that came later. The big difference should be that they were proposing something under a healthy form of science. Modern consciousness science seems anything but healthy.
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Pockett from paper:
“In any case, both psychological experiments on the initiation and control of voluntary actions and direct stimulation of the motor cortex of awake neurosurgical patients combine to support the conclusion that most of the processing underpinning the initiation of actions is unconscious—and more radically, that consciousness usually does not accompany either the initiation or the control of voluntary actions at all. From the point of view of the proposal that conscious experiences are patterned electromagnetic fields, this again suggests that it should be instructive to ask what anatomical feature distinguishes motor areas of cortex. As we have just seen, the motor areas of cortex do not produce conscious experiences, while sensory areas of cortex do. Hence, any major anatomical difference between motor and sensory areas might provide an important clue as to the structural differences between conscious and unconscious EM fields.”
My current view is vortices and traveling waves carry the information in qualia, but it may be that this is experienced locally, possibly through the EM field, at the neuron level as feedback. (This would align with Pockett’s view, I think, but she didn’t directly say it. She might even disagree with it.) The feedback also results in the continued movement of the waves or its diminution. However, the waves could always activate other neural pathways to perform motor action or other unconscious processes. Boundaries between regions might also result in modifications to the waves. So the view we have is literally like riding an unconscious wave with all sorts of things happening below the surface.
Reminder: For traveling wave think of the stadium wave. It is not everybody standing and waving at the same time, it is people standing and waving by sections in the timed sequence. Timing even could be part of the message. I think these waves are working on multiple time slices and speeds at the same time, probably from millisecond through multi-second range with overlapping waves. It may be that much of this is regarded as background operation in fMRI scans – in other words not easily detected.
Anyway, that’s brief view of my current “model.” LOL
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I guess I don’t so much need a “brief” sketch of your still evolving model, but rather one that’s “simple”. For example I believe that when light information enters my eyes, that the neural processing of this information results in some involved synchronous neural firing which creates an EM field that itself exists as me the experiencer of the detailed image that I now see. So that would be what I, as an experiencer (and thinker, and do-er), happen to be made of — certain parameters of this neurally produced field itself. Can you simplify your own conception of brain function regarding vision down to something basic like this? Or if not then do you have reason to believe that my simple model is probably wrong?
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What makes you think consciousness can be simplified?
I’m not sure how much simpler I can make it than:
“Vortices and traveling waves carry the information in qualia, but it may be that this is experienced locally, possibly through the EM field, at the neuron level as feedback.”
This is interesting. We have traveling/standing waves correlated with artificially induced hallucinations
https://medicalxpress.com/news/2024-09-hallucinations-flickering-brain.html#google_vignette
quote
“These waves resembled the ripples created by a raindrop falling into a pond. When raindrops fall at regular intervals, their ripples spread out, bounce off the banks, interfere with each other, and can create patterns similar to standing waves. Some parts of the pond’s surface appear still, while others oscillate with maximum amplitude. This is exactly what occurred at higher strobe light frequencies in our experiment. The traveling waves transformed into standing waves, with some regions of the visual cortex becoming more active and others less so.
“Our findings prove the earlier hypothesis that flickering light can cause standing waves in the visual cortex. Whether mice also hallucinated geometric patterns, we cannot tell because we cannot ask: this is the most challenging part of our research.
“However, there is good reason to believe that the standing waves we observed could be the mechanism behind flicker-induced hallucinations. People report that when the flickering light frequency is higher, they perceive finer hallucinatory patterns. And that is exactly what we also saw in the brains of mice. As the frequency increased, the patterns in the visual cortex became finer. We don’t have a definitive answer yet, but we are now showing convincing evidence for the first time.”
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My interpretation of that article goes like this. It’s observed that strobe lighting tends to create visual images, and modulated by strobe frequency. But it’s difficult to see which neurons in the visual cortex fire in the human, so instead they observe this in mice. There they found that strobe lighting creates visual cortex firing that propagates in wave like patterns of firing. Here there’s not only traveling wave propagation of where the firing occurs, but at higher strobe frequencies it’s like the waves hit the edge and then propagate back to create standing waves of firing. Furthermore it’s these higher strobe frequencies associated with standing wave firing in mice, that in people are associated with someone also seeing shapes as well. So its theorized that the shapes we see during such strobing is caused by standing wave patterns of such neural firing.
To me this effect seems reasonably explainable by means of EMF consciousness. For example the traveling waves of firing might be what sets up the EMF experiencer of a strobing light. Then when this wave of firing neurons is modulated to “hit the edge and bounce back” to interfere with coming waves of firing neurons, a spandrel EMF pattern may result that takes the form of the shapes that people report seeing.
The reason that I think consciousness can be simplified, is because causality seems to mandate simple solutions in the end. It’s essentially Occam’s razor. To explain things the human tends to postulate all sorts of magical nonsense that isn’t understood, and then empirical evidence comes along to whittle away those magical nonsense parts. Thus we’re left with explainable solutions that reflect causality rather than our initial magical explanations. To me that’s the essential story of science so far.
Regarding your vortices and traveling waves that carry the information in qualia (I presume such as what’s sent to the brain from light detected by an eye), I think you’re talking about waves of neural firing? If so then we’re consistent here. Then does this input information need any processing? I think it does. I think it’s the resulting firing that occurs after the input to create the special EMF which experiences the vision of light that enters an eye.
If I’ve got your input stance right then there’s the question of the processing of that input. Then given processed information in some form, there’s the question of what that information informs to exist as the experiencer of light. Such details should simplify things well enough for me to understand.
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“Regarding your vortices and traveling waves that carry the information in qualia (I presume such as what’s sent to the brain from light detected by an eye), I think you’re talking about waves of neural firing?”
Actually I think information from light reaching the eye goes through a good bit of preprocessing before it reaches the brain and even more processing before it reaches the visual cortex.
Again the traveling waves involve multiple neurons firing together (in line with McFadden and EMF theories) but the firings that compose the “wave” propagate like a wave in a stadium. So, the packets that compose qualia in my “model” are not a simple group of neurons firing synchronously but they consist of multiple groups synchronously firing over time in a pattern. Time is an essential part of the model.
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I’ll go along with a stipulation that processing might occur before information reaches the brain. The point is that there is input that gets processed. Some say that’s the end — that the processing itself exists as consciousness. I say that’s spooky because in a causal world processed information can only exist as such to the extent that it informs something appropriate. That’s where I think the EM field comes in to be what the processed information informs to exist as the experiencer. While I get the sense that you aren’t exactly opposed with this potential solution, it could be that you’re adding that just as stadium waves create interesting patterns when viewed from above, that potentially viewable patterns of neural firing may be quite important to consciousness. Is that right?
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I’m certainly not opposed to the idea that the EM field is involved and may be key. What I’m mostly saying is the McFadden and others EM field theories lack too many details. Especially lacking is any kind of translation or even any kind of suggestion of a translation between a wave-form and a quale. We need a Rosetta Stone.
I think there are some hints of connections, some align with EM field theory and some don’t:
1- It seems sometimes intensity of something, like a sound, seem to be indicated by the speed of the signal. (Speed implies time, so there you have time again.)
2- In other scenarios, population size rules. The more neurons firing on one side overrule the lesser number on the other side. Or, number of neurons equal intensity. In vision, number of sensory cones firing equate to intensity of color.
3- In grid processing, the physical location of the neurons firing in the grid is providing the physical location information of the organism. This seems almost like a scale model where the geometric alignment of neurons maps the geometry of the world of the organism. Grid processing may be all over the brain and used in abstract thinking – we understand concepts in a grid-like manner by (geometric?) relationships to other concepts on the grid.
4- The visual cortex itself has a retinotopic mapping directly to the neurons in the eye. Neurons in the cortex map one for one to neurons in the eye. A study claims this entire retinotopic mapping is transmitted (possibly traveling waves?) to the hippocampus where it appears as a sort of “negative” image. No understanding of why it would reverse was provided.
5- The brain itself is laid out geometrically. The layout of the sensory neurons map in scale-model fashion to the physical body. At the approximate center of the brain under the neocortex is the allocortex which sets atop the brainstem and thalamus. The allocortex contains key parts of the limbic system – the hippocampus and amygdala, for example – some of the most electrically active parts of the brain.
So my thought is that there’s more to the story than EM fields, although I did write this:
My current view is vortices and traveling waves carry the information in qualia, but it may be that this is experienced locally, possibly through the EM field, at the neuron level as feedback.
This means the EM field has only local effects, but the conscious information flow through the brain is governed by other physics possibly related to or similar to fluid dynamics.
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There’s no question that details are currently missing from McFadden’s theory. But then I wouldn’t expect massive amounts of details to get filled in before his essential theory has been empirically validated. And this is an area where he and I are somewhat at odds. I do like that he keeps an eye on relevant papers in science, and then tweets about it when there are points which correspond with his theory. (I presume he’d do so in reverse as well, though hasn’t come across reasonable evidence to the contrary.) But I also recall seeing an interview where Tam Hunt (an EMF panpsychist) asked him how his theory might be empirically tested? Unfortunately he said he didn’t know how to test it other than to wait to see if a conscious machine could be built through EMF hardware. And when asked how to determine that the machine was indeed conscious, he even said “I think we’d just know”. I find this all quite clueless. Because he proposes a well known brain produced element of physics to exist as consciousness, there’s no question that this could be empirically confirmed or denied experimentally. Even great theorists should sometimes be blind in certain ways.
I still like my proposal that scientists might add instruments to the brain which effectively produce radiation that’s around the parameters of standard synchronous neuron firing. Then if they can’t get these supposedly extraneous energies to alter someone’s consciousness through expected constructive and destructive interference, then consciousness must not exist as such an electromagnetic field. Otherwise this should be what consciousness is made of, though pending further testing. Furthermore, why is it possible for EMF detection arrays at specific speech areas of someone’s brain, to detect energies that highly correlate with the words that someone is trying to speak? Possibly because the radiation detected happens to be from an area which ephaptically couples with neurons that drive her speech muscles? (Fortunately McFadden has agreed with me here, and so has added this to his stack of papers which conform with his proposal.)
Regardless James, either it’s true that neurons fire with a synchrony that sets up an electromagnetic field which exists as all that is consciousness, or this is false. Dedicating testing ought to confirm things one way or the other. But saying that McFadden doesn’t propose enough answers seems neither here nor there. If his theory passes a wide assortment of empirical testing, then such testing would provide the sorts of answers that you’re asking about. What are the EMF parameters of “blue” or “itchiness”? If experiments suggest that the theory is true then scientists could try to determine these sorts of answers. And if we instead get evidence that effectively falsifies his theory, then sure, something else must be the case. I currently grasp McFadden’s simple proposal. I’d need to grasp any other proposal in order to potentially also assess it.
The thing about a consciousness that’s composed of “fluid” dynamics (by which I mean something like a gas or liquid), is that this doesn’t seem potentially dynamic enough to account for consciousness. I can imagine there being elements of a particular electromagnetic field that correspond with each element of the image that I now see. I can’t imagine a liquid or gas to be dynamic enough to hold all that information, and indeed, to change as the image that I see changes. And how might neural activity from around my brain create such a fluid that combines all of my consciousness into a single bound entity? Given the light speed by which they function, EM fields are continuous wholes from moment to moment. So that could work. Liquids and gasses however do not change in their entirety from moment to moment. So at the moment I don’t know of any other option that seems reasonable.
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“can’t imagine a liquid or gas to be dynamic enough to hold all that information”
You have to put the fluid in motion – think of tornadoes, hurricanes, eddies, turbulence.
Or think of this analogy.
A calm pond. As the temperature rises, methane bubbles start to rise to the surface creating waves. Later in the day, it rains and drops begin to create waves as they hit the surface. Each wave carries the information about the bubble or rain drop events. The information flows across the brain and interacts with the waves from the other events.
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I think we’re on the same page there. If brain consciousness does happen to exist through a fluid medium, then that fluid will need to be active. This is to say that associated wave dynamics in the fluid will be what constitutes a given example of consciousness. So for example when light enters your eye, this information ultimately leads to there being some sort of brain fluid with waves in it that correspond with each element of what you see, and that this fluid changes from moment to moment on the basis of newly arrived light information. Does that seem right?
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Not exactly what I was meaning. I’m saying that from the connectome emerges a wave-like behavior that results in neurons firing in sync as traveling waves. These traveling waves are not waves in an actual fluid medium, they are waves of firing neurons that behavior in similar fashion to waves in a fluid medium.
Waves generate in nature to dissipate or distribute energy, or equalize energy between different regions. The traveling waves in the brain may be performing similar functions (dissipate, distribute, equalize) with information.
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