That’s a bold claim, I know, but a new preprint may very well answer most of our questions about consciousness. It isn’t that different from various thoughts I’ve been kicking around for a while, but this comes from a well-known scientist at MIT, Earl K. Miller. Brain waves are how the brain computes and generates consciousness.
Without further comment:
Miller, E. K., Brincat, S., & Roy, J. E. (2026, July 7). Analog Cognition and Consciousness
https://osf.io/preprints/psyarxiv/z48x7_v3
Abstract
Cognition and consciousness may arise from bidirectional interactions between neuronal spiking and rhythmic electric field activity (brain waves).Goal-directed behavior relies on top-down control to coordinate large neural populations into low-dimensional, task-oriented dynamics. Brain waves are well suited for this role, exerting mesoscale influence over neural excitability. They can also support analog computation, shaping activity patterns according to underlying computational principles. Brain waves can flexibly route and organize neural signals, enabling multifunctional neurons to assume context-dependent roles, a hallmark of cognition. In this view, goal-directed thought, action, and unified consciousness emerge from cortex-wide wave dynamics that both reflect and transform spiking into coherent brain states.
Broad Speculations 
I read the abstract, not the full article. (I have read so many scientific articles over the years that now my head hurts when I get even inches away from my chosen subfield.)
I read about a proposed mechanism for the expression of consciousness, but no definitive linking between the brainwaves and conscious activities. So, have you read the article. Is this just another speculative framework for the existence of consciousness or actual step-by-step linking of brain activities to consciousness behaviors?
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Yes, I’ve read it but I also probably need to reread it.
It isn’t entirely speculative or even mostly speculative in my view. I’ve been working on something for a while that is very much along the same lines. The lead author is very recognized in the field.
https://ekmillerlab.mit.edu/earl-miller/
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You, sir, are the “real deal.” I am but a dabbler, but since I turn 80 in a couple of months I hope my dabbling keeps my mind going. When I die I want to observe the process!
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BTW, perhaps I should have explained this in the main post but the brain waves we are talking about are traveling waves like a stadium wave of neurons firing. It isn’t some kind of mysterious previously unknown force.
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Yeah, already heard of the brain awash with “waves” of signals. Someone has argued that these aren’t electromagnetic per se but might be pressure waves. There is so much more to learn.
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No, these are not electromagnetic or pressure waves.
They are traveling waves. Just think of baseball fans doing the wave. The neurons fire like the people standing in the stadium wave. The waves can move directionally across brain or rotate clockwise or counter clockwise in vortex or eddy patterns. They can cross functional boundaries and come from top down or bottom up.
If you read the introduction, the section on analog computation, and some of the last part where the theory compares itself with other leading theories (it has aspects of all of them), you can get a very good idea of the theory with minimal headache I would wager.
The paper does discuss EM fields and basically says what I wrote in 2024 that EM fields could be part of the mechanism that produces the traveling waves by recruiting additional neurons to the wave.
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Hi James. I went through this paper once essentially by letting the browser read each page to me. I then told ChatGPT that it seems quite supportive of McFadden’s theory, though conspicuously without mentioning his name. Initially it had limited access to the full paper so I pasted the whole thing in. I don’t know if you’d be interested in its full assessment, though you may have access to it here:
https://chatgpt.com/share/6a79e3f1-3368-83e8-83f6-af30af908ea6
The bottom line seems to be that Miller criticizes the traditional neurally “wired” brain computer for not being sufficient by itself (or like a telegraph system). Instead it implies evidence for the electric field to be doing much of the brain’s computational work, and in a highly coordinated way with neural function given the ephaptic coupling relationship. But it stops there for a more traditional sort of conclusion, or essentially that consciousness “emerges” from this more complex form of computer which contains an electric field component. Thus I’m able to criticize it for either stopping one step short of proposing what it is that processed brain information informs to reside as the substrate of consciousness (and here he can only be snubbing McFadden’s EMF proposal), or directly magical for postulating consciousness that needs no substrate. So by supporting McFadden though not going far enough to his conclusion, I presume Miller would not like my assessment at all! But it is what it is. Each of us wear glasses tinted to our own preferences.
Actually this gives me an idea. I’ll email McFadden regarding this paper to see if I can interest him in a conversation about it!
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I thought you would find the paper interesting and please check back if Mc Fadden responds.
I (and I think Miller) would argue that electric field effects are local but important to the wave dynamics. The brain would fry itself with the force of field that would be required to cross a significant part of the brain. What’s more there isn’t any evidence it moves that fast. Some research shows that it might take up to 300-500 milliseconds for perceptions to show up that might relate to corresponding brain activity. Plenty of time for traveling waves.
He writes: ” Synaptic and ephaptic interactions form a tightly coupled interactive loop with ephaptic mechanisms augmenting and helping coordinate spiking and synaptic transmission”.
The paper would agree with McFadden that analog computation with waves is what generates consciousness but the computations arise from billions of interactions of neurons, including both synaptic and ephaptic interactions. We have excitable neurons: 1) firing and delivering a neurotransmitter to connected neurons through a synapses; 2) triggering nearby neurons that might not be connected by electric fields. The combination has been evolutionarily tuned to generate the structural representations of analog computing.
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I took a look at the ChatGPT output.
You know you can download a complete PDF if you don’t want to deal with the online viewer.
I think it gets it mostly right when it says “what Miller, Brincat, and Roy are proposing is very close to the physical/neuroscientific half of McFadden’s CEMI theory.” But it is the part crucially missing from McFadden’s theory. McFadden’s theory actually doesn’t explain anything about consciousness except posit a ontological container for it.
But I don’t think the paper takes any kind of ontological position, as ChatGPT says. It is trying to explain what the brain is doing when it has a conscious perception, not what the “container,” if any, is for the perception.
Do we need a container for the perception? The perception may simply be in the neurons that are firing, one might argue, if we believe neurons firing in interacting wave patterns are the containers for the perceptions.
One more thing. Don’t believe everything ChatGPT tells you. It’s a real suckup.
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“Hi Pondering Points. I really like your video! But I like it in an ironic way that I think you’ve effectively displayed a true problem with nearly all “natural” consciousness proposals, that is except for mine.
I agree with your analogy that the brain is like a computer that must inform a screen in order to create a green square. So what’s causally appropriate for the brain to inform so that a green square might be seen by us? (And by extension, so that subjective experience can exist in general?) I also agree with you about the possibility that this occurs by means of an otherworldly god. Nevertheless I seek worldly explanations rather than magical (and specifically because magic effectively renders science obsolete to the degree that it exists).
From a natural perspective it seems to me that there’s only one reasonable possibility that makes sense. This is to say that just as processed computer information must inform a screen in order to create a green square, processed brain information should be informing an electromagnetic field which itself resides as what’s seen, felt, thought, and so on. The proposal is that when neurons fire with the correct sort of synchrony, the highly complex electromagnetic field that they produce itself exists as all elements of vision, hearing, thought, and so on. This was originally proposed by Johnjoe McFadden of Surrey University in 2000.
I don’t know how deep you might want to go into such speculation, but if you take a look at my new post and scroll down to the diagram, I suspect that you’ll quickly get a reasonable sense of what I’m proposing. Here there’s a nervous system with input, processing, and output computational components. But one of its outputs is an electromagnetic field that’s also a value rather than energy driven form of computer. I provide three forms of input, one form of processor, and also two forms of output such that this EMF subjectivity feeds back to the brain for full looping operation. https://eborg760.substack.com/p/post6-axiologically-founding-science (If you’re not yet on Substack then I think you’ll appreciate getting an account!)
With your video I’m hoping to more plainly demonstrate to naturalists that if they continually refuse to go with something like McFadden’s proposal, then their explanations must ultimately be magical. My goal would be for experiments to be set up that either empirically prove or disprove EMF consciousness. And even if proven true I hope you won’t be too disappointed, since there’d still be plenty of space left for God. In that case theists would of course interpret this field as “soul”, or the means by which He creates each of us. So not only might your video help improve science, but help theists grasp the mechanics of spiritual existence!”
…
So James, Pondering’s video gets to the very same thing that I get to by means of my thumb pain thought experiment. In a causal world we can’t just say that subjective experience exists by means of “computation”. Yes computer code may exist that instructs a computer screen to display a green square, but unless we add some magic it will not exist without a screen. Or in my terminology, information will only exist as such to the extent that it informs something causally appropriate. And though we know what’s causally appropriate for processed computer information to create a green square (which is to say a screen that displays it), we don’t know what’s causally appropriate for processed brain information to create consciousness. That’s where McFadden goes that Miller does not go. Miller merely adds that the brain seems to be using waves to process information no less that it uses synaptically gated neurons. Fine, and yes that supports McFadden’s position. But by not mentioning McFadden’s proposal at all it’s like he’s trying to go the standard magical route that computational functionalists take, or in Pondering’s analogy, postulating a green square by means of a computer that’s not even hooked up to a screen! So I think he’s correct to say that the standard account is inherently magical. He just didn’t know that one naturalist proposes something that doesn’t inherently need to be magical, and given that virtually all other theorists do not grasp the magic in what they propose. So here a theists seems to understand what’s required for causal dynamics to exist, while many naturalists don’t!
So moving on, I doubt that McFadden will respond to my last email. I probably got too far into my own stuff. He’s usually more happy with simple things where he can say “Thanks Eric, I’ll take a look”.
On the higher energies that would be required for EMF consciousness to be true, there’s a standard bias here that I think many make which I recall once mentioning to Suzi Travis. Observe that we don’t yet know what EMF energies would be required to exist as vision, pain, smell and so on. Since this is still open it’s possible that they’re extremely low and so no brain frying would inherently be required for consciousness to exist this way over reasonable brain distances. But then for such consciousness to actually have effects on the brain, or ephaptic coupling, higher energies would at least be required in certain places where effects are needed. So vision could potentially be composed of synchronous neural firing from distant locations, though in order for what’s seen to interact with the brain to create “thought about what’s seen”, higher energies would be required at least in associated areas of the brain.
On McFadden not explaining anything about consciousness, I think that’s where I come in to take his ideas further to the realm of psychology. In my dual computers model I propose how consciousness works beyond brain dynamics, or supervenient psychology. Here’s the latest diagram from my recent post.
On these modern LLMs saying what people what to hear, how else could they pay their keep? But no one believes in true agency as such, less than me!
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I think the problem you are having is that the brain doesn’t need a monitor to display its output. That is a complete illusion.
First, the notion of computer and computation needs to be dealt with. You can’t generalize from digital computation because the brain is doing analog computation. Analog computation uses structural representations, not digital representations. The structural representations are the contents of consciousness.
The brain doesn’t need an additional computing device or monitor to interpret its own content, because it is generating the analog representations that function as a simulation. No additional transformation is necessary. Imagine visiting a virtual reality exhibit where you can tour Mars. They fit you into a VR suit and you walk out of an “airlock” onto the Martian surface. You see a broad reddish expanse of rolling hills and ancient sediments in all directions. You can look at the pinkish-orange sky and wait for the blue tinted sunset. The reality of Mars was totally created by manipulating the information coming to your senses with the VR suit. In the same way, the mind is the analog information created in our brains with its nervous system that presents reality and our own sense of self. We are already in the representations. Our own simulation includes not only the external world but our own body.
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Let’s begin with where you seem to agree with Pondering and I. If the brain were merely a digital computer then yes, it would need to inform something causally appropriate that itself exists as what sees, hears, smells, feels pain, and so on. Here processed information must inform causally appropriate instruments in order to exist, and just as a screen is needed to see the words that ChatGPT spits out, or a speaker to hear them, or whatever else. So we’re good there.
Then furthermore you’re proposing that theoretically an analog computer’s processed information can itself exist as consciousness without informing anything else, or without an associated substrate as I propose. As I understand it this is because analog information can exist as “structural representations”, or essentially this can be what’s causally appropriate in order for consciousness to exist. So the processing of analog brain dynamics constitute the image of anything we might see on the basis of light information that enters our eyes. Similarly sound exists by means of such dynamics, as well as touch, taste, and smell. Here analog processing creates all felt pains and itchiness, as well as each of the thoughts that we have. So instead of my position where a highly complex EMF itself exists as consciousness in any given sense, you’re proposing that no substrate is needed because the analog processing in itself creates what sees, hears, feels, thinks, and so on.
Fortunately science should be able to determine between the two. If experiments were to not only validate EMF consciousness, but scientists were able to catalog EMF parameters of vision, hearing, and so on, then this is how neuroscience should finally expand regarding consciousness, and quite like how chemistry needed the atomic model in order for chemistry to finally begin making sense. If EMF consciousness were instead proven wrong however then I suppose there’d be the question of whether it simply goes one step too far? As you propose, could the analog processing of brain information constitute structural representations such that consciousness emerges without an associated substrate to inform?
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I really agree with a lot in your comment. And, I think your middle paragraph sums up where I am coming from almost perfectly.
I’ve been doing a lot of thinking about computation and I’m almost convinced that there are problems with how the digital/analog divide is constructed. The real division needs to be between abstract and structural representation. Abstract representation is arbitrary; hence, it has no meaning in itself but needs to be translated into something else (your monitor?) by decoding it. Structural representation presents information by its spatial and temporal relationships to other information. In other words, the information attempts to mimic the relationships and quantities in the information it is inferring. Structural representations are fundamentally what qualia are.
The problem with the current usage of analog is that many of the examples commonly cited – like Vannevar Bush’s differential analyzer – are ultimately still outputting numbers which are definitionally abstract. However, a reservoir computer, especially with natural materials in the reservoir, actually can develop the structural representations. In “Pattern Matching in a Bucket,” they use a bucket of water to produce structural representations of sounds.
https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-3-540-39432-7_63
Of course, this highly engineered and gimmicky, but it shows the potential to compute cheaply with something as simple as water. What would be the potential for billions of networked neurons that can organize into waves like the waves of the water in the bucket?
One other note. I think in McFadden’s approach he wants to emphasize the role of the electric field in triggering other neurons to fire (which this paper agrees with). However, something else to consider is that when many of the neurons fire in the cortex, the firing extends also to the thalamus in the lower part of the brain.
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One note I need to clarify.
“without informing anything else, or without an associated substrate as I propose”
All information has a substrate. The information is contained in the neurons themselves which could contain multiple variables as well as the temporal pattern. It is in the brain waves as they merge and interact that form the structural representations.
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Fortunately on Saturday morning I was finally able to come up with an acceptable response for that last one. But in truth I’m quite skeptical about what you’re proposing here. And I do tend to lose discussion partners when I effectively display my skepticism regarding what they believe. Modern AI seems to be haunting my computational functionalist friends right now. Apparently to subtly hide their embarrassment some say things like “Who fucking cares if AI is conscious!”, or the specific thing that their ideology postulated would become true once algorithms advance far enough to trick people into believing that they’re speaking with humans instead of technology. Then other friends are more sensitive about my criticism of philosophy and how behavioral sciences remain extremely primitive. Fortunately you and I seem more generally aligned. But I can also see how things could get strained if I effectively shoot your current proposal down. In the end we all want to feel good about ourselves regardless of what makes sense, and even though we sometimes pick the wrong horses. Perhaps I’ve done some bad picking? In the end science should effectively adjudicate. But if I’m correct that science remains quite fucked in terms of value (not to mention metaphysics and epistemology), then it could take a while for it to become unfucked enough to actually sort this stuff out.
My central point remains that unless we resort to magic, information can only exist as such to the extent that it informs something causally appropriate. Yes information will always have its own substrate, but that substrate will only be informational in a “potential” capacity, or regarding what’s causally appropriate for it to inform. If we want to see the letters that we type into a machine, and whether it’s digital or analog, some medium will be required to provide us with such a service. This is to say something causally appropriate associated with the function of that digital or analog computer. Otherwise its associated processed information will just be “stuff”, or potential information to causally appropriate screens, speakers, or whatever. I know of no exceptions to this information rule, and well beyond what we call the function of “computers”. A dvd disk in itself can be causally appropriate to shim up a table leg, for example, though it will only be informational in this or any other sense in respect to what it actually informs. (For a manual typewriter, the input would be pressing a key, the processing would be the swinging arm, and the causally appropriate thing that gets informed would be the marked paper.)
Therefore what might processed brain information inform which itself happens to be causally appropriate to reside as what sees, hears, feels, thinks, and so on? That’s the essential question which McFadden alone answers. I know of no competing proposals on the market. Beyond his testable EMF possibility, all others remain either incomplete in this sense, or directly magical for trying to evade it.
Even if what you and Miller propose violates my rule no less than computational functionalism does, at least you’re asking a coherent question. Can’t the analog processed brain information alone be what sees, hears, feels, thinks, and so on, or be what’s causally appropriate to reside as such without going on to inform a dedicated physics of consciousness? If that were true however then shouldn’t you find some counterexamples which disprove my rule itself? Why begin with an answer that’s apparently magical on the hope that it isn’t, without first demonstrating that information can exist as such inherently in various situations? And especially given the long pedigree of magical conceptions of consciousness?
Let’s say you happen to be a company engineer who is suppose to improve your computer’s ability to operate a screen sold by another company that gets plugged in. So here the desired output of your computer would be the processed information which emerges from this port, or the very thing that you’re charged with improving. So in a sense here it might be said that my rule has been broken — you’re interested in this information specifically. In practice my rule would remain intact however since this information would only effectively exist as such in respect to what it ends up informing, or the screen. Otherwise such potential information would merely remain “stuff”. In order to clear the way for your proposal that non magical consciousness can emerge by means of analog processed brain information that exists in itself as what sees, hears, thinks, and so on, you should need to find at least one situation where my rule truly does fail. How might we say that information can exist inherently, or without informing anything causally appropriate that itself constitutes the desired result? That would be a good start.
On the computation that occurs by means of water waves in a glass bucket, apparently I only have access to two pages of that paper, and on my own they didn’t make much sense. According to ChatGPT however the point is that when the energies of the speech from two people cause wave disturbances in this water, those disturbances effectively “compute”. So here processed information may be said to exist. My point remains however that unless the end goal is to create those specific waves (and I don’t know why we’d care about them in themselves), then such processed information would need to go on to inform something causally appropriate for a desired result. From what I can tell, here video of the water gets analyzed by a perceptron to tell us the words that created those wave disturbances. This is to say that something causally appropriate had to be informed by this water, and so once again my rule holds. To break it the altered water would need to be inherently informational in some sense. Then if you were to find a way for this to be true you’d have to display that analog processed brain information is also inherently informational, and such that consciousness results from this inherent rather than contingent information.
On digital versus analog, I consider this to be a distinction that’s made for epistemic convenience rather than ontological truth. In the end even a “digital” light switch exists as a continuous element of causality, and no less than an “analog” dimmer dial can let through less apparently discrete “off/on” states of electricity.
Since I believe we all have end goals which bias us, then beyond my perception that naturalism requires information to inform causally appropriate instruments, how might EMF consciousness conform with my interests in general? This has to do with my dual computers model of brain function. Here the brain is a relatively standard energy driven computer, though one of its outputs is an instead value driven form. Once neuroscience finally gains such a founding premise from which to build, I think it will become more possible for behavioral sciences in general to formally adopt the same value premise that already founds the successful science of economics. It currently makes me feel good to believe that I grasped the need for radical changes in academia long before any distinguished person had a clue about what ails these fields!
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You keep tossing around this “inform causally appropriate instruments” phrase but can you actually define what you mean by it?
What is being informed? What’s the nature of the information being used to inform? Can a neuron inform via synapse? What makes something “causally appropriate?”
Are red, green, and blue “values” or they some other kind of output?
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Right, if I want people to grasp my point then I should clarify what exactly I mean by “inform causally appropriate instruments”.
I’m saying that all known elements of reality exist as such when causally appropriate instruments become informed. A hammer is causally appropriate to drive a nail, or as I’m now using the term,
“inform” it. A marshmallow probably won’t be causally appropriate to do so. Everything that our computers do, like accept keyboard information, provide ChatGPT output, control certain functions of a modern car, and so on, only occur by means of informing causally appropriate instruments. I know you agree with this and so must wonder why I’m making such an obvious point?
In truth the only reason I’ve been forced to do so is because John Searle’s Chinese room thought experiment taught me something funky about what computational functionalists believe. But beyond that his thought experiment has largely been ignored, even Searle merely left the position he was attacking as “silly”, which computational functionalists have simply denied. Searle didn’t go on to explicitly display the magic associated with their position, and I presume because he never quite grasped how it violated causality. But perhaps I do.
I began by changing things up. Instead of a speculative consciousness proxy, or the “understanding” of Chinese characters, I went to a consciousness proxy that should be far less speculative, or something that feels what we do when our thumbs get whacked. And instead of putting Searle in a room to personally work through virtually unlimited sets of algorithms used by a hypothesized future Turing test passing computer, my thought experiment implements a computer of arbitrary computational processing capacity.
When our thumbs get whacked we know that neural signals about the event get sent to our brains. So theoretically there could be marks on paper that highly correlate with such neural information. And we presume that brain neural information gets algorithmically processed in order to do all sorts of causally appropriate things. The problem is that computational functionalists explain the resulting thumb pain as the processing of input information in itself. Therefore their position holds that if the correct marks on paper were scanned into a computer for algorithmic processing such that the correct other marks on paper were printed out, then something non-specified here would experience thumb pain. It’s a magical position because in a causal world information can only exist as such by informing causally appropriate instruments.
Therefore instead it must be that the brain not only processes what’s sent from the thumb, but for this to be informational it must inform something causally appropriate which itself exists as the experiencer of this pain. Or in the marked paper scenario, if the correct marks on paper were algorithmically processed for the printing of the correct other marks on paper, it would only potentially be informative to something causally appropriate which itself would experience such pain. So a computer would need to scan this second marked paper that then goes on to inform what’s causally appropriate to reside as the physics of an experiencer of thumb pain (and presumably with similar physics residing as vision and all elements of consciousness).
So now back to Miller, it could be that he’s essentially trying to do what computational functionalists have been attempting, though in more of an analog capacity. So when “this” analog information gets processed into “that” analog information, consciousness results. My objection remains the same however, or that one further step would be required. This is to say that processed analog information can only exist as vision, pain, thought, and so on, by informing something causally appropriate that itself exists as vision, pain, thought, and so on. The only brain substrate that I personally know of which seems to have enough bandwidth to potentially encompass each element of what I see and such, is its electromagnetic field.
Looking further at what you’ve said, I think you’d like to get rid of abstract representations altogether (whether “digital” or “analog”) on the hope that an effective consciousness solution exists in structural dynamics alone. But then again, structural dynamics are actually how ALL things work in the end. Abstractions merely help us think and talk about structural dynamics. Words may be abstract to us, but nothing’s abstract in the end. Academia should better grasp this once it becomes empirically understood what consciousness effectively exists as. You know what I suspect will result. Then our words would reduce back to those structures themselves rather than exist in an ultimately abstract capacity. It’s the same for colors and all other components of consciousness.
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Nice attempt, but I’m not buying as it is.
A hammer might be causally appropriate to drive a nail, but I don’t see that it is informing anything. It is simply physical causation. I don’t any kind of information being passed to the nail or the wood it is being driven into unless you count any kind of physical causation as information. If everything caused is being passed information, then you are in panpsychism territory.
“get rid of abstract representations altogether (whether “digital” or “analog”) ”
Digital representations are abstract. Analog representations are not abstract. Both are useful for what they do, but they aren’t equivalent.
Here’s a paragraph from something I should publish soon.
Here we come to ultimate problem for any claim that a digital computer, or any type of computer using abstract representations, could be conscious. Abstract representations don’t stand for anything in themselves. A binary representation “01110110001” could represent hunger, the left thumb hurts, or blue. It doesn’t acquire meaning except by translation, and it is unlikely any of us have consulted a translation table to conclude we are hungry. An abstract representation as arbitrary codes isn’t a structural representation even if it contains all the information necessary to produce a structural representation. The abstract code must be physically interpreted, decoded, or instantiated in a system whose spatial, temporal, or relational organization mirrors the represented structure. Whereas, the analog representation already is what it represents.
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I doubt you actively meant to straw man me there, or knew that I didn’t mean that a nail becomes conscious when a hammer hits it, though nevertheless implied this to be my position by reinterpreting my use of the term “inform”. At the time this probably made sense to you. But of course no, I didn’t mean that any more than I consider a computer screen to become conscious when a computer informs it. There’s a deeper point that I’m making about what might be causally appropriate to be informed to thus reside as what sees, feels, thinks, and so on. But perhaps this particular conversation has gone stale. Thus the need to take this up again later.
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Sure, let’s resume later. I will have something fairly substantial sometime soon.
To your thumb whack example. When you whack your thumb with a hammer, information from various senses typically flows to the brain. Primary, of course the pain signals and they end up exactly at the relative spot in the brain that spatially corresponds the location on your body of your thumb. The cortical homunculus is a distorted human body map drawn across the brain’s surface and there is spot that corresponds to the thumb on it that begins processing the pain signals. Here is “something causally appropriate” that simulates the pain at that location because it is being processed exactly at that location. However, usually we also are receiving visual signals of the damage, probably even audial signals since you likely heard the hammer hit the thumb, that information is passed along to the other “something causally appropriate” parts of brain to decide course of action which may then trigger “something causally appropriate” in the motor cortex to cause you to move to nearby faucet to run the thumb under cold water.
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Yes that sound good. Write that one up and next time I’ll see if I can demonstrate my point more effectively (which indeed disputes the position of any kind of “spatial cortical homunculus”). Or equally significant, perhaps I’ve instead missed something important!
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The cortical homunculus is a well-known anatomical fact.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cortical_homunculus
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Right, I didn’t say that correctly. I do not dispute that there are cortex areas associated with sensory input and motor output which can be mapped out sequentially as if full body operation exists in these locations, or “a human within”. What I dispute is that the processing of brain information in itself can exist as sensory input like touch, taste, smell, vision, pain, and so on. As I see it such processed information can only exist as such by going on to inform something causally appropriate that itself exists as touch, taste, smell vision, pain, and so on. And the only reasonable possibility which might serve this role that I know of, is a neurally produced electromagnetic field. Then once the EMF thinker decides to do something that requires muscle function, theoretically this field ephaptically couples with motor neurons in a way that causes such muscle function. So if you argue that qualia exist by means of processed brain information in itself, I’ll argue that something more is required.
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It sounds like you’re looking for an actual homunculus implemented in the EMF.
So, is the pain in the finger located in the EMF where the thumb is located in the sensory homunculus? Or, is it spread all over the cortex? If it isn’t primarily in the sensory homunculus, then why are the nerves from the hand connected to that region? And, does stimulation of that region create feelings in the hand as Penfield found?
BTW, Wilder Penfield’s findings have been validated but the story from recent research is that the everything is much more complicated and there is considerably more overlap in the regions than the original “map” suggested.
Also, many of the same mesoscale activities, such as traveling waves, also operate in the motor cortex and other research additionally indicates that the motor cortex itself has its distinct contribution to cognition.
Did you see my comment to Eric Schwitzgebel on Substack in regard to how to measure the “richness” of experience?
The richness of experience relates directly to number of variables it integrates weighted by the number of neurons involved in the wave, vortex, or interference pattern it generates. More variables, more neurons, more richness.
This suggests that consciousness comes on scale, although there may a minimum amount possibly found in arthropods, but not worms. Individual brains could have pockets of sufficient consciousness to generate a memory, but not be immediately or easily recallable. Vision is richer than taste because it involves more neurons and more variables. Conceivably whales may have a richer experience than we do.
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You’re asking lots of technical questions here, though my answers should seem a bit arbitrary until you’re able to grasp and use my dual computers model of brain function yourself. In terms of consciousness at least, I consider neuroscience about where chemistry was before the rise of the atomic model — early chemistry simply shouldn’t have made much sense to chemists until they were armed with this model. And that’s only part of the failure here. Behavioral sciences in general, from psychology to anthropology, should remain similarly primitive until they’re able to accept my dual computers model of how the brain works. The only advanced science among them is economics, which I think escaped the same fate because society permit it to presume that feeling good/bad is what constitutes the value of existing, or thus drives this “second computer” that is consciousness. Rather than pre-atomic chemistry, economics seems more like modern meteorology.
It could be that we perceive thumb pain in our thumbs rather than in a neurally produced electromagnetic field, because the field is inherently where all consciousness happens to reside. Because that field is where the thumb is seen, heard, smelled, tasted, thought about, and so on, we perceive the pain to be “in the thumb”. With sight to be “in the eyes”, and hearing to be “in the ears”, and so on. Theoretically these are merely input sources however. If consciousness exists as a neurally produced EMF then that’s exactly what we should be perceiving. It’s generally helpful for us to have such perceptions even if they’re technically wrong. Hand region cortex stimulation theoretically causes feelings “in the hand”, because this incites synchronous neural firing that adds appropriate energies to the field which itself exists as this sort of consciousness.
I hope you’re right about more neurons being required for “rich” consciousness, or at least if that means “strong”. In that case ants wouldn’t be suffering nearly as much as they seem to be when I spray a line of them with insecticide. I suspect not however. I suspect that the pain base horrors associated with our world, is ridiculously tragic. I suspect pains exists far beyond the good which is felt.
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To be honest, I still don’t understand your two computer model or why you think you need two. But here’s an idea. Make a presentation and put it on YouTube or some other outlet. Use whatever tools you are familiar with. I would probably use something like PowerPoint combined with voice over. I would investigate tools for animation that are not built into PowerPoint. I would find music and sound effects if they worked into the presentation. If you do that, I will promise to watch the whole thing. This could be your chance to market your ideas too.
Regarding “richness,” I’m not sure anybody clarified what they meant by the term in the comments. My interpretation was “richness” meant something like we mean when smell or taste is described “rich.” Usually we mean there is many dimensions or variables to the sensation. like wine can be smooth, fruity like black berry, chocolatey from aging in oak barrels. Rich sound has multiple instruments with complex tones or faithful reproduction of such. Rich sights have vibrant and complex colors.
But the number of variables needs weighted in some way by number of neurons. You’ve probably heard of the movie of a man in a gorilla suit crossing the basketball court while players are tossing around the ball. People told to watch it and count the dribbles frequently miss the man in the gorilla suit. When attention is focused on one task, something which would normally attract our notice gets ignored. My guess is that there are simply a lot more neurons working on the dribble count, so the gorilla doesn’t generate as vivid or rich experience to register on immediate memory. Oddly, however, in cases, I think it might actually be recalled later.
I wouldn’t spray your insects. I even mowed around a yellow jacket nest in our front yard, after being stung several times. We need insects. I would advise not deliberately causing them any pain no matter how small it might be.
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My apologies on the great length of this response! Hopefully it will nevertheless help.
Now that AI makes it so easy, you’re certainly right that I should start making videos to help explain my various positions. That’s indeed what Pondering Points does. And he does this even though we tend to only believe what we want to believe rather than what makes sense. It amazes me that even a full theist is able to grasp the magic associated with standard conceptions of consciousness in neuroscience today. Well done! The issue is that he didn’t realize that McFadden has a potentially natural consciousness proposal beyond all those magical accounts. Will he take my advice to explore this proposal? Of course he won’t! Learning about a conception of consciousness that isn’t inherently supernatural, should conflict with his end goal of promoting theism. Similarly no computational functionalist should watch his video and thus grasp that they’ve actually been endorsing magic. As I’ve said, we mainly just believe what we want to believe rather than what makes sense. I suppose I’m just as guilty as everyone else.
I continue to suspect that science won’t effectively kill the magic associated with consciousness, until the testing that I’ve proposed ends up validating McFadden’s EMF consciousness proposal. Here a person would have brain implanted EMF transmitters and detectors, initially probably in targeted visual cortex locations. Then scientists would produce energies that ought to disturb the precise EMF that is theorized to exist as what a given test subject sees. If test subjects report nothing strange about what they see then at some point it would be determined that endogenous EMF (which they know they’re constructively and destructively interfering with), must not exist as vision. Thus the world’s first scientifically falsified consciousness proposal!
If instead there were reported visual effects however, next would come the complicated task of determining if the exogenous energies were having these effects by means of altering the endogenous field that itself is suppose to exist as consciousness, or rather that this alters neural function for consciousness effects in still unknown ways? And here some tell me that it should be impossible to determine between the two because if the exogenous energies alter the field, then that will inherently alter neural firing. Perhaps, though I still think it should be possible to determine one scenario from the other. If EMF consciousness is true then we should expect these scientists to learn about the EMF parameters of different colors, brightness, 3-dimensional space, lines, and so on that constitute vision. So imagine them using what they learn to create field energies such that a subject reports seeing a colored square, as well as cause it to move in the field of view and change to specific colors in accordance with the field energies documented to reside as such components of vision. Here the simple explanation would be that the field itself exists as the substrate of what’s seen. Conversely the complex explanation would be that such energies alter neural function to create such visual effects by means of some still unknown neural dynamics. So here I think EMF consciousness would effectively be proven true.
The gorilla experiment is easily addressed under my dual computers model. EMF consciousness, as a single highly complex field, thus inherently functions in a serial capacity. Conversely the brain is known to compute in massively parallel ways. Thus if a given consciousness is quite focused on counting dribbles, it thus may not notice something strange that’s also in the field of view, like a person on the court in a gorilla suit.
If you’d like to understand my dual computers model of brain function, try this account. Let me know which elements seem unclear.
Life of course evolved without brains. I presume that nothing felt good/bad for anything that existed because there was no consciousness. This is to say that nothing was driven to function by means of value. Then the “first computer” evolved in certain forms of life, or brains. This essentially took life to a “robot” stage. And still I believe nothing was driven by means of value, and just as nothing feels good/bad to our robots. While things might have gone on this way forever, as it happens there seems to be a problem with such algorithmic instruction alone. For brevity I won’t get into that. But given massive neural function in early life that had brains, imagine the emergence of a non-functional consciousness that only exists as such given that the proper value physics happens to exist. And let’s presume this to be the correct parameters of neural EMF. So given that algorithmic brains hit a functional limit, I propose that in certain situations this value experiencer was given the option of making certain minor organism decisions that brain algorithms weren’t addressing well enough. Furthermore theoretically such consciousness did well enough to actually evolve. Thus beyond the energy driven brain there also emerged a value driven consciousness. This is “the second computer”. So instead of functioning by means of the electricity that drives our computers, or the calories that drive our brains, this consciousness computer seeks to feel good rather than bad.
Then as for how this second computer works in conjunction with the brain that creates it, there’s an associated diagram about this from my most recent post. Over there it’s of course explained in depth, though I could also field any questions that you might have.
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Try Googling Transcranial Magnetic Stimulation (TMS) effects on visual cortex
You don’t need to implant anything to prove what you are trying to prove as I understand it. You can alter vision from an external magnetic device. Already done. All that proves is an EMF can make neurons fire.
One thing that would make the diagram clearer is that you get rid of the orange lines and put the boxes that compose the larger function inside a box labeled with the name of the function. So, there would be big boxes for Body Layer, Nervous System Computing Layer, and Consciousness Computing Layer. The Nervous System Computing Layer and Consciousness Computing Layer would be inside the Body Layer with bidirectional interaction.
If I understand your diagram, the nervous system in the body computes and outputs to a consciousness computing layer (which you propose as the EMF) that then feedbacks to the nervous system through ephaptic coupling. It would be helpful to know a little bit about the outputs from the nervous system to consciousness computing.
All in all, it’s a plausible approach but how do you draw the line between nervous and consciousness computing layers. Ultimately the EMF is produced when the neuron fires and its form is controlled, I’m guessing here, by the physical form of neuron. So, the computation of the nervous system produced the EMF which feeds back to the nervous system (why?).
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Is this your drawing in essence?
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Probably would look better with Input-Processing-Out arranged vertically.
But looking at it now, you got a lot of stuff happening in that EMF without a lot of explanation of how it does it – especially so with memory. How does the memory even get stored?
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Would it be fair to describe this as a sort Electromagnetic Dualism where consciousness happens in the EMF that can interact with the body. So, there’s a Mind and Body but the mind is physical force, the EM field – so it doesn’t have the classic mind/matter problems.
For me, there isn’t any fundamental duality at all. Mind is the information embedded in the material, so once the nervous system in your model has finished computing the result goes straight back to the neurons possibly storing working memory as a propensity to generate waves triggered by possibly a small number of neurons. Possibly this propensity is cleared mostly at night with a more permanent record created for it based on its salience.
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Actually I’ve been aware of TMS for quite a while. The thing is that this works in a fundamentally different way than what I’m proposing by means of my EMF consciousness test. In TMS relatively massive magnetic energies are focused to specific brain regions to potentially cause various neurons to fire (or not) on the basis of that provided exogenous energy. And indeed, when no light enters the eyes it’s well known that tampering with visual cortex neuron firing this way can cause a person to report minor visual effects known as phosphenes when no light enters the eyes. Such noise is of course overwhelmed when actual light enters for normal vision. But sure, TMS should have thus helped neuroscientists determine the V1 — V5 visual cortex areas. So that’s good.
In any case the test that I propose instead concerns energies that are many orders lower, and specifically on the order of what’s produced when tens to millions of neurons fire in synchrony. The point would be to constructively to destructively tamper with the endogenous energies that are theorized to exist as a person’s vision, and by means of appropriate exogenous energies. And sure, if these exogenous energies were to alter neural firing somewhat then fine, it is what it is. The energies of synchronous neural firing ought to do that as well. But altering neural firing wouldn’t be the specific point of this test (and would actually be a bit of a complication). The point would be to see if changing the EM field associated with standard synchronous neural firing, would change what a person sees.
Think of it this way. With your eyes closed you don’t see much. When you open them however, theoretically the light that enters instantly gets neurally processed to cause hundreds of millions of neurons to fire with a synchrony such that each color, shape, edge, texture, brightness, and so on in your field of view, exists exactly as such because those neurons produce an electromagnetic field which is exactly correct to reside as each element of what you see in itself. Then when you close your eyes again, theoretically the associated synchronous firing ends to stop that highly complex field to instead result in the more simple state associated with seeing phosphenes and whatnot. So if exogenous energies that correspond with the energies of tens to millions of synchronously firing neurons, were produced in targeted visual cortex locations, and experts think those energies ought to constructively and destructively tamper with the endogenous energies that are theorized to exist as what you see, then you ought to report alterations to what you see should the theory be true. This is not because these extremely minor exogenous energies alter neural function per se, but rather because the field itself becomes altered. Thus a potential means of testing the theory.
Your question however got me thinking about the possibility for testing by means of simply inserting needle like probes into visual areas of the brain. AI seemed pretty supportive of this proposal. Apparently there are already extremely small transmitters that are set up to transmit the much higher energies associated with altering neural function. Thus something similar should be possible for energies that are many orders lower. Apparently the V1 can be accessed only a few millimeters into the cortex.
I asked ChatGPT two questions about this. While it seems not to show my questions, these are the answers it provided (in case you’re interested):
https://chatgpt.com/s/t_6a907cfcadc08191a591782cd908dd7d
https://chatgpt.com/s/t_6a907e20e4708191b9783efce81211ee
In any case I’m pleased that you’re asking about the technicals of how I consider brain and mind to relate. Yes it could be considered a sort of dualism in the sense that brain is “material” and mind is “energy”. McFadden has referred to it this way, and even related this to Einstein’s famous “energy equals mass times the speed of light squared” equation. The point is it’s possible that consciousness does not reside on the mass side of the equation, but rather the energy side. Also your diagram does seem to work as another way of taking this. Regardless, some practical scenarios might help illustrate what specifically I’m proposing.
For my standard thumb whack scenario there are several ways that the conscious form of computation could be informed about such an event. If you see your thumb get whacked then theoretically light enters your eyes (under “nervous system that accepts input”) and so ocular neurons send associated information about this event to your brain for algorithmic processing. One output of this should be to cause neurons to fire synchronously in such a way that the produced EM field itself resides as the you which sees this hammer hit your thumb. Similarly there should be corresponding touch neural input from the hammer that goes to your brain from your thumb and gets processed algorithmically to cause neurons to fire synchronously such that EMF energies themselves exist as the you that experiences thumb pain. Or you might hear the hit and so air pressure waves reside as input that ultimately results in the EMF which constitutes hearing that hit.
Then beyond any memory, sense, and value forms of input (and I’ll get to memory in a moment) theoretically there will be an EMF thinker that also exists by means of synchronous neural firing that itself ponders what’s sensed in the quest to feel good rather than bad. Theoretically while the brain is effectively an energy driven computer, consciousness is instead motivated by means of the value physics associated with such EMF. Also for many years I hoped that this thinking element would essentially be inherent to the system, but no, I’ve decided that associated neurons should need to fire to create this thinker.
From “thought” I then provide both automatic and active forms of ephaptic coupling by which consciousness feeds back to affect brain function. Let’s say that you smell something that automatically causes you to remember your childhood bedroom. So here the EMF conscious experience itself ephaptically couples with neural dynamics to run through the brain loop again such that neurons fire with the correct synchrony to provide you with that memory of your childhood bedroom — the smell input incites the memory input. Furthermore I use this automatic line to address repetitive learning. The more you do something consciously, the more automatic or non-conscious such function should become. The mouth’s ability to enunciate the words that we speak should largely have formed by this means for example.
I also provide a decision output box for things that are consciously decided. A thinker might decide to snap their fingers. So here ephaptic coupling exist as an input to neural function, and once algorithmically processed this goes on to cause the correct neurons to fire such that your muscles cause this to get done. Conscious thought can incite far more than just muscle function however. We can decide things to hopefully remember, like how to do something, or perhaps how to think about someone given their behavior. There are of course many different types of memory, but in a conscious sense the theme is that ephaptic coupling occurs such that strengthened synaptic connections form regarding neurons associated with what you’d like to remember (or perhaps just will remember regardless of desire). Thus when you’re trying to remember someone’s name for example, a neural chain might exist such that synchronous neural firing is then able to emerge which itself provide the associated EMF memory of “Henry” or whoever.
On the line between the brain and mind, I consider the brain as a relatively standard energy drive computer. Though it’s massively parallel and evolved rather than designed, I consider it ultimately just driven by means of calories. But then as for EMF consciousness, I consider this to exist in an entirely phenomenal capacity. It instead seeks to feel good rather than bad.
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As far as inserting electrodes, that’s already been done too. That was what Wilder Penfield’s experiments did. If you insert an electrodes, it will directly stimulate neurons with electrical energy and you won’t be able to distinguish EM field from electric current. Even if you manage somehow to put something in the brain that generates an EMF but doesn’t directly stimulate neurons by electricity, I don’t see what you are expecting to happen beyond what Penfield’s experiments and TMS results shows.
Regarding TMS itself being too strong, I would say it can probably generate whatever level of energy you want simply by changing the input current.
But that isn’t the main problem either that ChatGPT identifies:
“The difficult part is demonstrating that you’ve changed the relevant EM field without materially changing the neural state. The microcoil literature shows that even relatively localized magnetic stimulation can activate neurons.”
The problem is your theory requires that the EMF trigger neurons to fire, but if it triggers neurons to fire it has changed the neural state.
If the EMF works totally independently from neurons and the neurons only serve to create it in the brain, then there isn’t any reason you shouldn’t be able to create a conscious EMF outside of the brain. McFadden proposes how to do this in this paper.
https://www.frontiersin.org/journals/systems-neuroscience/articles/10.3389/fnsys.2025.1599406/full
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Right James, McFadden believes that there’s an EMF physics of sight, sound, pain, thought and so on, or consciousness. Therefore neurons would merely be what evolution used to create this form of function. I believe this too. The position mandates that anything that you feel, smell, think, or whatever, would thus be possible for the correct parameters of EMF to also feel, smell, think, or whatever, and even when produced by human built technology rather than a brain.
Where McFadden and I differ is that I think it would be ridiculously challenging to actually build a functional consciousness technologically, and especially one that feeds back to operate a machine somewhat like the evolved brain is fed back to. Furthermore without first getting strongly supported empirical verification that consciousness exists as EMF, why would we even try to build such a machine? So I consider my proposed test far more doable. Instead of building the correct sort of computer that theoretically could create the correct field energies, my proposal merely involves testing people, or subjects that we already know can be conscious. In truth I don’t actually care about creating conscious machines. I care about improving science where it most fails, or in neuroscience and all behavioral sciences other than the already advanced science of economics.
To help better demonstrate my testing proposal I’ve been asking AI more questions. The following seems most helpful, and perhaps opens the door for a test that might require only modest technological modifications and costs. I’ll provide my question below and then link to its answer.
Me: “But given all this, can the scenario be further simplified? Let’s say a probe in v1 might reasonably transmit .4 milliwatts to create reasonable neural alterations. And perhaps we know this because when no light enters a subject’s eyes, phosphenes are reported. What I’d like to know is how many watts, whether micro, pico, or whatever (and tried in countless phase variations and whatnot), should be required for neuroscientists to say “These exogenous energies should have interfered with the endogenous energies of local synchronous neural firing”. It’s the order of magnitude difference that I’m asking about here. And it doesn’t need to be measured in watts. But I do at least want “apples to apples”. Here we have one form of testing with high energies from which to directly alter neural function (that perhaps we now know could involve around .4 milliwatts). What might the physics require for a probe to reasonably alter the EMF of local neural synchronous firing? I suspect with the correct modulation, the associate energies could be thousands of times lower to do so. And the experiment itself would be to see if such low energies could create reported alterations to vision that are quite substantial, and yet the massive energies associated with altering neural function itself are reported to produce extremely small phenomenal alterations, such as merely seeing phosphenes (that might also be explained by means of an EMF source, not that this matters currently).”
https://chatgpt.com/s/t_6a95a89fde088191af5ffd375711e770
From the above link it sounds like a probe inserted into V1 to alter neural function needs to use energies around 1000 times stronger than the probe that I propose to interfere with the local EMF of synchronous neural firing (at least in terms of EMF dipole strength). Apparently transmitters that produce such low energies don’t yet exist given that neuroscientists haven’t had reason to interfere with endogenous neural EMF. But I presume it wouldn’t be all that difficult to build such transmitters. And fortunately EMF detectors do exist because they help neuroscientists grasp when neurons fire. So for the test that I propose, a given brain probe would have both an EMF detection element as well as a transmitter element that’s set up to produce exogenous EMF that should interfere with local endogenous EMF.
If such testing were done, one possibility would be that researchers would be able to alter the endogenous EMF of test subjects in visual areas of the brain, but test subjects would not report anything strange about what they see. With enough such results at some point it would be safe to say that consciousness does not exist in the form of a neurally produced EMF. Thus the worlds first falsified consciousness proposal. But if these very low energies do elicit visual alteration reports, then scientists would try to learn about why. If they were to thus learn the EMF components of colors, brightness, 3-d space and so on, and to the extent that they could create planned images for someone to see, then that ought to be strong support. Of course it could still be that these weak exogenous energies alter neural function to create these effects in unknown ways. But the more experimental confirmation that other senses can be cataloged in terms of EMF parameters, the weaker such challenges should become.
Given that the energies associated with altering the EMF of synchronous neural firing might be around 1000 times lower than what would be required for a standard transmitting probe to alter neural function, one objection would be that such consciousness shouldn’t thus be able to feed back to the brain. But that’s not exactly true. These field energy should still affect neural function somewhat (and far more so quite locally), though perhaps in subtle and still unknown ways. Such function is of course known as ephaptic coupling. My dual computers model of brain function depends heavily upon this component of EMF consciousness.
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” I propose to interfere with the local EMF of synchronous neural firing”
Interfere in what way?
If you interfere with the firing so other neurons don’t fire wouldn’t your theory predict nothing will be experienced. McFadden relies on the synchronous firing of thousands of neurons to produce sufficient EMF for the EMF to be able to compute. If they don’t fire, they can’t compute.
If you trigger additional neuron firings, on the other hand, and something is experienced, you can’t isolate the EMF from the probe from the firings of the other neurons. You also won’t know if your EMF or any EMF did anything because the experience could have been caused by the neurons themselves through their synaptic connections.
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BTW, I think there might be a way to rescue the EMF as a key part of the phenomena that is compatible with Miller’s paper and my views. But it isn’t compatible with yours. This is my thought not Miller’s or this paper to be clear. It goes roughly like this.
Consciousness comes with the brain needs to integrate large and multiple streams of information.
For example, take vision. Color comes from three different types of cells in the retina but has to be combined with a bunch of other channels to handle brightness and shadows. Photoreceptors and retinal ganglion cells cannot see edges; they only see circular spots of light. The brain must combine many circular spots to draw a straight line. So the information streams I’m talking about are streams in the biological sense of the different types of cells and pathways through which the information. Of course, there are bunch of other things like motion detection that are involved in vision. Eventually, this information must be integrated into something we call “vision.”
These multiple streams come together as interference patterns generated by interactions of their traveling waves. Of course, these patterns are constantly changing as the information in the streams change. Since these traveling waves contain different types of information, they could be imagined as being “decorated” with a different EM signature. Conceivably (although not required), a single neuron could carry multiple signatures at the same time, possibly in the dendrites. As each stream interacts with the others, the result is like a changing mosaic of signatures that appears to us as our mental artifacts. The larger the number of neurons involved the more likely it is to conscious.
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Your second response suggests the sorts of things that you’ve been proposing, and indeed, I agree with you that I propose something different. But your first response suggests that you don’t grasp what specifically it is that I propose. And regardless of whether or not my proposal happens to be true, you’d need to grasp it before you could effectively assess it. Let’s go in steps.
Imagine a brain that’s entirely non-conscious and so runs an organism quite like a computer operates a robot. Then also imagine this brain such that as a temperature detector in the organism gets above 80 degrees Fahrenheit, an algorithm becomes implemented such that neurons fire with a sort of synchrony which creates an EMF which itself begins to feel an uncomfortable heat. Furthermore as the detected heat goes up, the EMF becomes modulated to parameters where that experiencer thus feels worse and worse in this sense, and specifically because such EMF happens to involve the physics which constitutes worse and worse feeling in this sense. Let me emphasize that neither the organism nor brain will feel this heat, but rather only a thusly produced EMF. Also note that this would be a “consciousness” since there’d be “something it is like” to exist as that EMF, though in an entirely epiphenomenal way — there’d be no way for it to affect organism function such that it might relieve this discomfort. Good so far?
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My questions in the first reply were about your testing methodology and what kind of conclusions you could draw from it. If your theory relies on neurons firing, then you can’t refute the criticism that whatever is experienced is simply the result of those neurons firing whether it was triggered by probe or triggered by other neurons. There is nothing to compel a conclusion it was the EMF was critical to the experience.
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I’m going a bit deeper than that however. I’m saying your response suggests that there are some ways in which you aren’t grasping what my consciousness proposal happens to be. If so then my proposed means of testing it should not make sense to you. So instead of my past lengthy explanations, I’d now like to just present a few concise points about what my proposal happens to be. If successful then I’d like you to consider my test from that perspective.
Currently we’re imagining an organism that functions on the basis of an entirely non-conscious brain, and quite like how a non-conscious computer can operate a robot. Beyond that however I’m saying that there’s a temperature sensor in the organism that causes neurons to fire with a synchrony that creates an EMF which itself feels uncomfortably hotter and hotter above 80 degrees. Though this doesn’t do anything practical regarding organism function itself, I’m saying that an EMF consciousness would exist here in the sense that this physics would feel such discomfort as an effective sentience. If you’re okay with this then I’ll expand the scenario to hopefully better display what my proposal happens to be.
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Most organisms maintain a basal metabolic rate that generates a temperature well above 80 degrees or they would be dead. Aside from that, most of our feelings of hotness are sensations of the body reacting to heat – vasodilation, sweating, changes in heart rate. Most of these responses originate in the hypothalamus automatically without conscious intervention and will happen even if the person is in a coma as long as the hypothalamus is undamaged. Of course drinking water or moving to an air conditioned room aren’t options for the unconscious person. So, this seems like a particularly poor example.
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Except that you’re opening up some matters that are tangential to the points that I’d like to display about what my consciousness proposal happens to be. I’m not talking about an actual organism but rather something hypothetical. I could arbitrarily say 100 degrees rather than 80, but it wouldn’t matter. All that matters is whether you can begin with a hypothetical organism that functions by means of a non-conscious brain. So this is essentially a biological robot. And one element of that robot is higher temperatures cause neurons to fire with a synchrony which creates a functionless EMF that itself feels uncomfortably hot, or a functionless consciousness. If you can begin with that premise then I can build further.
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Let me get this right.
You’re “not talking about an actual organism” but a “hypothetical” one that has neurons and one element “causes neurons to fire with a synchrony” to create some kind of feeling of hotness.
So, can we conclude this is effectively a p-zombie that can function completely normally but doesn’t feel anything until you put a probe into it to make its “neurons fire with a synchrony.”
Since this hypothetical organism gets along quite well without feelings then any consciousness would be unnecessary and possibly detrimental.
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Well sort of, except a p-zombie is suppose to function like a human and yet have no consciousness. This is not suppose to function like a human. It’s just a biological machine with a brain that’s able to survive in nature. And then beyond that there’s a non-functional element that feels worse and worse as the temperature goes above 80 degrees. So there’s a consciousness in this sense, though it’s extra because it does nothing adaptive (or non-adaptive) for the organism. Ready for more?
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So, this could be nematode, for example. Or anything with neurons, except the neurons in this case don’t behave like neurons because they exhibit no coordinated behavior. How do we know the nematode is feeling anything when this “element” gets triggered?
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I didn’t say that the neurons don’t behave as neurons because they exhibit no coordinated behavior. I said there’s an organism with a brain that survives in an entirely non-conscious way. And we know that the EMF feels more and more uncomfortable as the temperature goes above 80 degrees because that’s explicitly what’s been stated. I won’t continue building this model further until you acknowledge these parameters alone.
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If the neurons already exhibit the synchronous firing that produces the EMF then the organism would be conscious and not a robot according to your theory. If they don’t exhibit this behavior, then these are special neurons that behave differently from other neurons.
I’m still having a difficulty imagining how you put a temperature sensor configured to fire when the temperature is greater than 80 degrees in a 98.6 brain and get anything other than continual firing. Or, if this sensor is outside the brain, how does it affect the brain.
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I logically can’t correct you about how my theory works if you insist that my theory works differently than I say it works. There are two elements to this scenario. One is a non-conscious organism with brain dynamics that help it survive. Another is that neurons can create an EM field which itself feels uncomfortably hot, though without affecting organism survival in any significant way. Can you accept these two non contradictory provisions in a purely hypothetical capacity?
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Okay, one. “A non-conscious organism with brain dynamics that help it survive” basically is a p-zombie aside from the fact you have opened p-zombiehood to a wider range of creatures than humans. I can accept that as a hypothetical with the unlikely possibility it could ever become actual.
On the second, you’re going to have to explain what “feeling hot” means because I’m not sure there is a single “feeling hot” feeling. Feeling hot, as I said, is a composite of feelings generated from autonomic and physiological reactions triggered primarily from the hypothalamus – sweating, blood flow, skin warmth. That’s why it is possible and frequent that people feel hot without any change in external temperature – embarrassment, menopause hot flashes, fever, etc. Because these other events trigger overlapping physiological mechanisms with actual hot temperatures.
So, if we want to lump those feelings together and call it “feeling hot” I can go with that.
“That neurons can create an EM field which itself feels uncomfortably hot,” Well, that’s your theory isn’t it? But I can agree for the sake of argument but you probably need multiple EM fields unless you are referring to some higher level cognition of “hotness” that recognizes that the organism needs to cool.
“though without affecting organism survival in any significant way”
So, if I feel hot, I could opt to simply feel hot and not drink water or move to shade. In that way, the feeling hot wouldn’t be affecting my survival but my autonomic nervous systems has already triggered the physiological reactions that would affect my survival. If I can’t cool, I’ll die. So, is this an organism that can feel hot but be unable to take any action to mitigate the problem maybe by lacking the higher level cognition?
Or, is this cognizant EM field completely isolated from all of unconscious brain dynamics that help it survive by causing the organism to drink water and move to shade? Again, we are sort of back to the p-zombie – an organism with a brain with neurons that appears normal, and it behaves in every way how we expect sentient organisms to behave, but actually is completely a robot.
So I don’t see this as two “provisions” but more like a bunch of imprecise hypotheticals.
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I’m beginning with just two simple provisions. And I don’t think you grasp that you’re complicating them by injecting more. But what potential would there be for me to explain how my theory works when there’d be so much else to potentially complicate? Probably not much. Sometimes that’s just how blogging goes! It’s been fun and I expect us to find more fun things to talk about later.
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Here are your two points:
One is a non-conscious organism with brain dynamics that help it survive.
Another is that neurons can create an EM field which itself feels uncomfortably hot, though without affecting organism survival in any significant way.
The first is a essentially a p-zombie, which for the sake of argument only, I can agree with.
The second is completely unrelated to the first. I can’t even tell from your statement if the neurons in the second statement are in the same organism from #1 or a different organism. Or are these just neurons in a Petri dish? In any case, the statement is what you are trying to prove I assume. So, I can’t accept it as a premise for your argument.
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Try this. You know that there are various organisms that have no brains. Can you conceive of one variety of them evolving a brain, and yet there being no consciousness? Or do you believe that brain function itself mandates consciousness? Can’t people have functioning brains and yet no consciousness when under sufficient anesthesia? A functional brain without consciousness is my first simple condition. But for some reason you’re bringing in the Chalmers p-zombie idea like I’m adding something magical here. In order to continue, at the very least I’ll need you to acknowledge the legitimate and practical possibility for there to be a functioning brain and yet no consciousness.
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It is unlikely that worms are conscious and they have brains. So, it is possible for an organism to have a brain and never be conscious. But I believe most, if not all organisms, with larger brains (~100K+ neurons) likely have some degree of consciousness if they are not in a coma or anesthetized. That same range also corresponds to the presence of distance senses like sight and hearing with insects like the fruit fly on the lower end.
Of course, a person under sufficient anesthesia is not conscious and the brain is functioning in the sense that its autonomic functions haven’t shut down. So, that would be a functioning brain but only a barely functioning brain to maintain vital functions. So, if that is what you mean by functional, sure that’s functional.
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So given that you suspect worms have brains without consciousness you can now see that my first condition is reasonable. Good. And we can take this further. If you did not know that there were worms with brains and yet no consciousness, then you might erroneously presume that brain function itself mandates consciousness. So it’s not your understanding of what exists that mandates what exists, but rather something else. I say this so that you might also grasp my second condition (and more that I haven’t yet mentioned). Otherwise I doubt you’ll be able to understand what my consciousness proposal happens to be (and not be) well enough to effectively assess my testing proposal.
The second condition is that neurons can fire in a way that creates an EM field which itself feels uncomfortably “hot”, or if you like just “bad”. I’m speaking of a punishment, or the opposite of feeling good. Here the organism itself feels nothing, and yet the EMF that it produces will thus suffer. Furthermore this particular phenomenal EMF has no significant effects upon the organism’s function or survival. I’m currently referring to an epiphenomenal consciousness.
Can you conceive of a brain that helps a non-conscious organism function, as well as creates and EMF which itself feels bad without affecting that organism’s function?
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So, this is a brain that creates as EMF that feels? If the organism were able to talk, would it report that it feels bad? I would assume not, otherwise it would be conscious.
Okay fine, but an “EMF that feels” is speculative, especially since it produces no observable effect on the organism’s function. But this isn’t the same as “epiphenomenal consciousness” as the term is ordinarily used, because epiphenomenal consciousness is consciousness so it applies to organisms that are conscious.
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It sounds like you’re roughly grasping my concept of EMF consciousness. The theory is that it’s only causally possible for certain parameters of EMF to feel good/bad, or indeed, any other component of consciousness. Theoretically only the correct parameters of EMF can exist as such, and simply because that’s how physics works. So if you’ve got the concept then it should be possible for me to explain how I suspect the modern consciousness that we actually do have, was able to evolve.
There should have been a time when there were organisms that had brains that functioned in an entirely non-conscious way, or about like our algorithm guided robots do. They’d accept input information from around the body and algorithmically process it for output function. Much is made of the many different forms of life that emerged around 539 million years ago, and for 13 to 25 million years. And while I can’t say if this Cambrian Explosion was related to brain function that also gained the consciousness that’s now being addressed, perhaps this was around that time. Or maybe consciousness emerged later.
Because we know that consciousness did evolve, it also seems reasonable to presume that fully non-conscious brains alone were not sufficient to deal with what they needed to. Otherwise consciousness wouldn’t need to have evolved at all. I suspect that more “open” environments were challenging, or the opposite of what exists in a game like Chess. Regardless there must have been a problem given that consciousness has become so prominent in life. Otherwise perhaps even something like a human could have evolved without it, or perhaps a bird.
Now imagine early brain based life that would sometimes also create a non functional consciousness that feels anywhere from good to bad, and specifically because neurons fire such that the associated parameters of EMF becomes produced by chance. So this would be a consciousness that doesn’t affect the organism. Then let’s say that certain iterations of such consciousness also gain the ability to decide certain things for the organism to do in very limited ways (and given that non-conscious function alone should have been problematic as just mentioned). I’m specifically postulating that this EMF consciousness came to affect neural function in adaptive ways through ephaptic coupling. And while success by means of just one opportunity would be ridiculously unlikely, in the scenario here there could be massive numbers of failures and yet evolutionary success in the end. That’s effectively how evolution works — over countless iterations various adaptive changes do tend to occur. This is how I propose that even modern human sight, vision, smell, thought, and so on, evolved by means of non-conscious brain function.
I do realize that there’s quite a bit here that could remain unclear. If so then perhaps I can make some clarifications if you have some questions. Next would be to go directly into my testing proposal itself.
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So, you’re just proposing this evolutionary path:
Non-conscious brain -> Non-conscious brain with EMF field -> Conscious brain
It still doesn’t explain what about an EMF field makes it so special. And if the EMF has no effect originally how would evolution select for it?
Why not a simpler path?
Small number neurons -> More neurons -> Lots of neurons/conscious brain
If more neurons = more functionality, then evolution would select for it.
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That’s sort of the path, though in the end the brain always remains 100% non-conscious. Here the brain merely creates the EM field that is consciousness. So it bases some of what it does on the consciousness field, though never “becomes conscious”. And yes I realize that this argument does seem extra complex. But it is what it is.
The trickiest bit might be going from non-functional EMF consciousness, to functional. Theoretically there were these brain functioning organisms that had a technical constraint (probably “open” environments), as well as a primitive “side” consciousness that has no true effects. But because EMF energy does have the potential to alter neural function, at some point such consciousness did by chance evolve true effects, and adaptively so. That’s the theory. The proposal is that non-conscious brains have a basic problem and so they ended up creating an auxiliary consciousness to monitor and base some of their function upon. Because non-conscious function alone was insufficient, the EMF conscious element progressively evolved to become an auxiliary second form of computer, or the phenomenal dynamic of sight, sound, taste, thought, and so on.
Regarding what’s special about EMF, I do think there are special things to say about it. For now I’d rather not get into such tangents however. I’d like to get back into testing this “dual computers” proposal. That depends upon your ability to permit this to be about an energy driven brain computer that often tends to create a value driven EMF computer, or something which can merely affect the brain rather than “make it conscious”.
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My view is a better argument would be that coordinated activity of large numbers of neurons could add to functionality as brains grew in numbers of neurons. The ability to coordinate activity arises not simply from synaptic connections but also ephaptic coupling. Larger numbers of neurons firing correspond to stronger EMF fields which may or may not be directly involved in consciousness, but certainly are involved in some way.
If you have a slight gain in functionality as coordinated activity grows, then evolution could select for it and its usage could expand with the development of the remote senses.
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Okay, so you’re proposing something different. We obviously all have our own perspectives regarding this still failed area of science. But the interesting element of mine is that unlike all other worldly consciousness proposals on the market that I know of, this one is substrate based. So while technically other proposals have nothing to potentially test that itself is suppose to exist as consciousness (given their “no substrate” parameter), there is such an element here, or the EMF itself. So that’s where I’ll now go to see if you grasp my testing proposal.
The theory is that each specific element of what you see, for example, like each specific blade of grass or whatever, exists exactly as such (color, shape, position, brightness, and so on) because of an amazingly complex though ridiculously low energy EMF associated with the correct synchronous neural firing. Therefore it ought to be possible to push probes through the scalp to enter visual areas of the brain that detect the EMF which constitutes a person’s vision. But here we’d merely detect this EMF without grasping the deeper significance of it. More importantly, I propose that such probes also produce transmissions that ought to produce extremely tiny EMF energies that constructively to destructively interfere with EMF consciousness itself given phase and amplitude types of effects. And here I’m not talking about the pathetic effects associated with TMS, like how phosphenes may be reported if no light enters the eyes. I’m talking about potentially fucking up what someone sees in massive ways. If what you see exists as an amazingly pristine EMF, then it should not be difficult to alter such imagery in massive ways if the field itself were constructively to destructively interfered with. It would simply be a matter of having tools that get in there to affect the right EMF with appropriately tiny energies. And here I mean tools that produce the EMF energies that ought to affect the EMF of tens to millions of firing neurons. Therefore I’m speaking of extremely specific and targeted low energies rather than more general higher energies. These energies should be consistent with the tiny energies that neurons themselves produce, and from similar locations given inverse squared effect diminishment as distances increase.
If massive testing in this sense does not result in at least certain instances of massive reported visual alterations, then at some point this should become the world’s first falsified consciousness proposal. But if there were visual alteration reports consistent with the theory, then what specifically becomes reported? If the theory is true then scientists should be able to refine such energy parameters for such experiments, and in relation with the overall brain energies recorded at the point of the probe. Here they should be able to learn things like the EMF parameters of color, 3D visual space, brightness, lines, movement, and so on. Then with such understandings they should be able to produce novel EMF energies that themselves reside as what’s seen, like specific shapes, colors, and so on.
I do acknowledge that altering the brain’s EMF in any sense does alter neural function. But if science can indeed produce more and more novel images exogenously by means of EMF transmissions alone, then it should become more and more difficult to argue that these visual effects instead result from accidentally also causing the correct neurons to create such effects in still unknown ways. And of course vision would just be the start. Theoretically all elements of consciousness exist in the form of a pristine EMF that evolved to compliment the function of a brain that itself is not conscious. At some point I think it would be safe to say that this field itself exists as the correct sort of physics which itself resides as consciousness.
Regardless of whether another consciousness theory actually happens to be true while this one is false, does this testing proposal itself seem flawed?
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I get the proposal but, if you have probes emitting an EMF, you will affect the firing of the neurons. Once you affect the firing of the neurons, you can’t exclude something more than the EMF from your probes as the cause of the experience. I wouldn’t be surprised that training the EMF transmissions from the probes would result in novel experiences because it would trigger different patterns in the neurons firing. I don’t see any reason for your optimism that your experiment would exclude explanations other than EMF. Actually if different traveling waves were generated by the probes that correspond to the novel experiences, it would argue in favor of Miller’s approach in this paper under discussion.
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It sounds like you don’t see a conceptual problem with my testing proposal. Should scientists learn to create novel things for people to see by means of their exogenous EMF energies, you’re concerned that they wouldn’t be able to sufficiently distinguish if the field itself resides as the experiencer or rather that the field alters neural function to create such effects in still unknown ways. But that doesn’t suggest that we shouldn’t try such testing. One productive scenario here would be the discovery that appropriate exogenous energies never massively alter what someone sees. Thus EMF consciousness could effectively be dismissed to give science its first falsified consciousness proposal. This should be a good lesson from which to potentially help teach consciousness scientists how to do consciousness science.
Also it’s possible that results would be achieved that highly conform with EMF consciousness. Perhaps such testing would help scientists catalog EMF parameters of vision, hearing, taste, touch, smell, pain, and so on. And let’s interpret this from your pessimistic position that EMF consciousness wouldn’t be sufficiently validated since those exogenous energies might instead create such effects by incidentally also affecting neurons in ways that reflect the truth of a different explanation. Even without full confirmation however, shouldn’t the scientific ability to “play someone’s consciousness” through exogenous EMF, and somewhat like a piano can be played, be the greatest empirical breakthrough regarding consciousness that’s ever been achieved? If something else were true, like the Miller proposal for example, it seems to me that refined testing should help display this. It all depends upon what exactly scientists would end up finding, though I see no downside to such testing itself. Furthermore if probes that barely enter the brain could be used to begin such testing (rather than the need for full surgical implants), then this should be far more doable in the short term than I figured before this discussion.
Given success it also seems to me that all sorts of random known pieces of the puzzle might finally start fitting together. Perhaps synchronous neural firing is the only good neural correlate for consciousness found so far, because such added energies are required to reach the correct EMF consciousness zone (or a domain with less potential for individual firing to tamper with)? Perhaps consciousness functions serially rather than through parallel paths (as in how we can’t have a verbal conversation with someone while also reading a book), because the field itself is inherently one unified entity? Perhaps “representational drift” (where different neurons from day to day fire to create the same sorts of consciousness effects), is observed because consciousness does not depend upon which specific neurons fire but rather the EMF that they produce? Perhaps consciousness has no “binding problem” because the various components of it associated with the workings of different parts of the brain, become whole through the light speed unification of the field itself. But even before neuroscience, for me only a “something” rather than “nothing” answer could ever truly make sense. It’s difficult for me to conceive of existing as a process alone instead of a tangible something which a process creates.
(By the way, I paid $10 for a month subscription to Noah Smith’s substack so he gave me 5 free one month subscriptions on the hope that I can hook some friends. You might like the one I sent you. I particularly enjoyed his post about the possibility for AI conceived viruses to take down civilization. Unlike most AI bullshit, to me this seems plausible. https://www.noahpinion.blog/p/heres-how-were-all-going-to-die)
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There is the conceptual problem that your experiment, even if it works as you anticipate, can’t prove the EMF is the source rather than the adjunct to the conscious experience.
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I wasn’t calling that a “conceptual” problem because that specifically would be something for scientists to determine on the basis of experimental results. How to refer to it is just semantics however. More specifically it sounds like you don’t have a good argument suggesting that this sort of testing should not be tried. For that one would need to argue that things like tampering with brain EMF around the parameters of standard synchronous neural firing without reports of phenomenal effects, would not challenge the theory’s validity. Or that success cataloging EMF components of vision, hearing, taste, and so on to a degree that they could be exogenously produced for report, wouldn’t support the theory. Actually it occurs to me now that if scientists were indeed able to use such experiments to precisely enough catalog EMF parameters of various elements of consciousness, then the theory could also be tested by means of EMF detection alone and so go beyond the possibility for exogenous energy neural tampering explanations. If EMF monitoring technology could ultimately predict the same sorts of phenomena that a subject reports, then even the possibility for a separate exogenous energy explanation, would be lost.
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The thread distinguishes mechanisms that organize neural activity from the separate question of why our consciousness judgments are reliable.
New Argument from Consciousness
This video explores the meta problem of consciousness proposed by David Chalmers and argues that naturalistic processes couldn’t have given us knowledge of consciousness
This is my video: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=WJVvZNi0Fi8
Drafted with AI assistance.
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Thanks, I would rather you put your thoughts in the comment rather than just posting a link.
If brains don’t produce consciousness, then why did God give us brains? We don’t ask God for a fish when we have a fishing pole.
I see the problem: if our Self is tied too closely to the brain and body, then bummer – no afterlife!
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